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Benedict Sheehy* and
Donald Feaver**
Anglo-American Directors' Legal
Duties and CSR: Prohibited, Permitted
or Prescribed?
The interaction between corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations
and directors' legal duties is underexamined. This article addresses that void
by examining directors' duties in case law and legislation across the major
commonwealth countries and the U.S.A. It provides an analysis of leading cases
and examines how they deal with directors' duties, the doctrine of shareholder
primacy, corporate legal theory and CSR. The article reviews fiduciary relations
and duties and analyzes the directors'duties to exercise power in the best interests
of the company as a whole and for proper purposes. The article concludes that
CSR is well within the accepted range of directors' duties and, in some instances,
mandates.
L'interaction entre les obligations et Ia responsabilit6 sociale des entreprises
(RSE) et les devoirs 16gaux des administrateurs n'est pas examinee d'assez
pres. L'article tente de combler cette lacune en etudiant les devoirs des
administrateurs definis dans la jurisprudence et dans les lois des plus importants
pays du Commonwealth et des Etats-Unis. L'auteur analyse des arr6ts importants
et examine la fagon dont les devoirs des administrateurs sont trait6s, le principe
de la primauts des actionnaires, la theorie juridique concernant les soci~t6s et la
RSE. II passe en revue les relations et les devoirs fiduciaires et analyse le devoir
des administrateurs d'exercer le pouvoir dans I'intPrt superieur de la Societ6
dans son ensemble et . des fins approprides. En conclusion, il affirme que la RSE
fait bel et bien partie des devoirs et des obligations acceptes des administrateurs
et, dans certains cas, de leurs mandats.
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT University, Melbourne,
Australia.
** Professor, Graduate School of Business and Law, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia.
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Introduction
The move toward the institutionalization of corporate social responsibility
(CSR) in Canada,' the U. S.A., 2 the U.K.,3 Australia4 and elsewhere makes an
investigation into its legal implications an important endeavour. Although
the law of corporations has significant if subtle differences in Canada, the
U.S.A., the U.K. and Australia, in terms of the law relating to directors'
1. R. Janda, "Bill C-300: Sound and Measured Reinforcement for CSR: A Report on the Legal
and Policy Dimensions of Bill C-300" (1 September 2009), online: Canadian Network on Corporate
Accountability <http://www.cnca-rcrce.ca>.
2. Daniel T Ostas, "Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive's Social Responsibilities
with Regard to Law" (2004) 41 Am Bus LJ 539. And see generally, Joe (Chip) Pitts, "Business, Human
Rights, & The Environment: The Role of the Lawyer in CSR & Ethical Globalization" (2008) 26
Berkeley J Int'l L 479; D McBarnet, "Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law, For
Law" in D McBarnet et al, eds, The New Corporate Accountability (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
3. Companies Act 2006 (UK), c 46, s 172.
4. Corporate responsibility reporting has become de facto law for business. See David G Yosifon,
"The Law of Corporate Purpose" (2014) 10 Berkeley Bus LJ 181; Paul Redmond, "Directors' Duties
and Corporate Social Responsiveness" (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 317; and Benedict Sheehy, "Defining
CSR: Problems and Solutions" (2014) J Bus Ethics (forthcoming) [Sheehy, Defining CSR].
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duties, it is markedly similar.' The basic controversy, as illustrated in the
consternation surrounding the decisions in Peoples Department Stores
Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise6 and BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debenture Holders,7 is
whether, or when, directors are permitted, prohibited or prescribed to
exercise their decision-making discretion to engage the corporation and
its assets in activities referred to as CSR-the use of assets to advance the
interests of non-shareholder constituents.
It is important to note, in a paper engaging in some comparative
law analysis, that the argument is not that the law of corporations is the
same in all these jurisdictions. Rather, the claim is that the theoretical
underpinnings and practical issues with respect to directors' duties are
comparable across all four jurisdictions.' The point of taking a multi-
jurisdictional approach is that it brings to light trends and patterns that
cannot be discerned from a deeper but narrower analysis of a single
jurisdiction. In an environment where corporations and corporate law
are increasingly felt extraterritorially, indeed globally, a broader view is
critical.
Law is a dynamic aspect of society's life. Whereas in the last century
Friedman could boldly assert that the corporation's social responsibility
was to maximize wealth9 and Kraakman, in a moment of neo-classical
economic triumphalism, declared that corporate law's evolution had
reached its zenith in a particularly ideological version of American
5. Bernard S Black et al, "Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive
Grounds for Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency)" (2007) Colum Bus L Rev 614.
Nonetheless, there are significant differences between Canadian, US and UK law on some of the
issues discussed in this article. See M Fadel, "BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate
Law" (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 190. Redmond's recent treatment of the topic of director's duties and CSR
in Australia illustrates the subtle differences. Redmond, supra note 4. See also Sheehy, Defining CSR,
ibid.
6. - Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee o)) v Wise, 2004 SCC 28, [2004] 3 SCR 461 [Peoples
Department Stores].
7. N Dietrich, "Revlon Redux: Reconciling the BCE Case in Change of Control Transactions-Is
Lyondell the Better Way" (2009) 10 Bus L Int'l 218; SP Bradley, "BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders:
The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance and Good Corporate Citizenship"
(2009) 41 Ottawa L Rev I; Fadel, supra note 5; J VanDuzer, "BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The
Supreme Court's Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples"
(2009) 43 UBC L Rev 205; JG Macintosh, "BCE and the Peoples' Corporate Law: Learning to Live
on Quicksand" (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 255.
8. John Farrar, "In Pursuit of an Appropriate Theoretical Perspective and Methodology for
Comparative Corporate Governance" (2001) 13 Austl J Corp L 1.
9. Milton Friedman, "The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits", The New
York Times Magazine (13 September 1970).
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shareholder primacy, ° the facts tell a different story." Even as they were
undertaking their research, the planet was going in a different direction-
in which corporate power carries corporate social responsibility. From the
international and transnational soft law initiatives such as the UN's Global
Compact, 2 the Global Reporting Initiative 3 and corporate-sponsored
regulatory initiatives such as the Kimberley Process, 4 aimed at improving
social performance, to the hard law of regulatory reform and judgments
of courts supporting and imposing such social initiatives, law has moved
in a different direction at odds with the voices of the business press. Far
from precluding expenditure of corporate wealth on social issues as those
scholars may suggest, 5 not only does the law allow attention to social
issues, but in particular contexts, even mandates such attention.
This article examines the core of discretions and responsibilities
surrounding the corporation in the context of CSR. These discretions
and responsibilities at law are found in the law of directors' duties. These
duties have evolved over the last few centuries to determine the scope of
and purpose for the directors of corporations and to provide parameters
for the exercise of their discretion. These duties impose a range of legal
sanctions from prohibitions, to permissions, to obligations that touch all
aspects of CSR.
CSR may be defined as private self-regulation focused on
ameliorating and mitigating the social costs of industrial organizations.' 6
It has three normative grounds: economic prosperity, Social justice, and
environmental quality. 7 It is operationalized within the firm through a
10. Henry Hansmann & Reinier H Kraakman, "The End Of History For Corporate Law" (2001) 89
Geo LJ 439. They use the term "ideology" in their work to describe the view. See also, Amir N Licht,
"The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style" (2004) 29 Del J
Corp L 649.
11. Leonard I Rotman, "Debunking the 'End of History' Thesis for Corporate Law" (2009) 33 BC
Int'l & Comp LJ 219; Adam Winder, "Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History" (2004) 67 Law & Contemp Probs 109.
12. United Nations, "UN Global Compact," online : United Nations <http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/>.
13. Global Reporting Initiative, online: Global Reporting Initiative <https://www.globalreporting.
org>.
14. Kimberley Process, online: Kimberley Process <http://www.kimberleyprocess.comi>.
15. Daniel T Ostas, "Deconstructing Corporate Social Responsibility: Insights from Legal and
Economic Theory" (2001) 38 Am Bus LJ 285.
16. Sheehy, Defining CSR, supra note 4.
17. J Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business (Oxford,
UK: Capstone, 1997).
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four-responsibilities approach.18 Within the concept of CSR is a rejection
of the idea of medieval law that the corporation is solely a private
group. Rather, CSR conceptualizes the corporation as the organizational
infrastructure for large multinational, social and political actors, with
significant environmental and social impacts.' 9 Consequently, these actors
must evidence the attributes of citizenship and, as such, the dialogue of
corporation citizenship2° has been engaged.
The argument is not primarily a normative argument about law reform;
rather, it is a positive enquiry into the existing legal framework. As such, it
works through the well-known and familiar cases; however, it does so at a
finer level of detail using the lens of CSR. Rather than simply conducting
a review of the high level shareholder primacy norm, which is largely
unenforceable in any event2' and limited to the U.S., the analysis examines
the particular aspects of specific directors' duties in relation to both non-
shareholder constituents and the norm.
At law, in essence, two basic duties are imposed on directors. 22 There
is a basic duty of care and skill, which ensures directors fulfil contractual
and tortious obligations, and a fiduciary duty which is often expressed as
a duty of loyalty.23 While it is an oversimplification in that directors are
18. These are: 1) an economic responsibility to produce goods and to be profitable; 2) a legal
responsibility to abide by law; 3) an ethical responsibility to do what is right and fair beyond that
required by law; and 4) a voluntaristic responsibility. Archie B Carroll, "A Three-Dimensional
Conceptual Model of Corporate Social Performance" (1979) 4 Academy of Management Review 497.
19. Benedict Sheehy, "CSR and Law: Alternative Regulatory Systems," online: (2012) SSRN
<http://www.ssm.com>; Benedict Sheehy, "Conflicts between CSR, Corporate Law and the Problems
of Social Costs," online: (2012) SSRN <http://www.ssm.com>.
20. L Whitehouse, "Corporate Social Responsibility as Regulation: The Argument from Democracy"
in J O'Brien, ed, Governing the Corporation (London: Wiley, 2005) 141; Lisa Whitehouse, "Corporate
Social Responsibility, Corporate Citizenship and the Global Compact: A New Approach to Regulating
Corporate Social Power?" (2003) 3 Global Social Policy 299.
21. D Gordon Smith writes "the shareholder primacy norm is nearly irrelevant with respect to
conflicts of interest between shareholders and nonshareholders... [it]may be one of the most overrated
doctrines of corporate law" in "The Shareholder Primacy Norm" (1997) 23 J Corp L 277 at 322-323.
22. As Sealy points out, they are fewer "duties" than grounds for challenging directors' decisions. LS
Sealy, "'Bona Fides' and 'Proper Purposes' in Corporate Decisions" (1989) 15 Monash UL Rev 265.
23. In Canada, see the Canadian Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, s 122(l)(a), (e)
[CBCA]; E Waitzer & J Jaswal, "Peoples, BCE, and the Good'Corporate 'Citizen' (2009) 47 Osgoode
Hall LJ 439; VanDuzer, supra note 7. In Australia, see the Corporations Act 2001, ss 180-183. See
Charles O'Kelley & Robert B Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations: Cases and
Materials, 6th ed (Gaithersborg, Maryland: Wolters Kluwer, 2010) at 277. See also, Model Business
Corporation Act, s 8.30 (1950) [MBCA]. For critique and review of change in the MBCA, see O'Kelley
& Thompson, ibid at 324.
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not held to tort standards because of the business judgment rule, 24 it is the
latter duty in which directors have the most latitude in decision-making
and the ambit of which decisions relating to CSR would be challenged. It
is not that the duties of skill and care are irrelevant. Rather, directors are
able to argue before courts that decisions with respect to CSR are matters
of discretion and not matters related to negligence. For the most part, these
duties are not markedly dissimilar in their common law and statutory
forms. Thus, one may emphasize the common law interpretations without
doing violence to the statutorily codified form. The principles remain the
same. Finally, in some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, whether the duties
of care and contract; or loyalty are at all "fiduciary" is questionable.25
In examining the fiduciary duty, we may say that the duty with respect
to directors' discretion is singular. It is the duty of a fiduciary toward a
beneficiary. Summed up, this duty is to act in the interests of the beneficiary.
Correct discharge of the fiduciary duty precludes self-dealing, exploitation
or other actions that are the subject of the broadly framed directors' duties.
The issue of correct discharge is usually dealt with by reference to the
proper purposes doctrine. That doctrine holds that a fiduciary's powers
may only be used for the specific and particular objects for which they
were given, namely, the benefit of the beneficiary.
In the context of corporate law, directors are a peculiar type of
fiduciary. Their duty requires not the conservation of assets as is required
of fiduciaries in other contexts, but the opposite: the putting of assets into
play, the taking of measured, but ultimately unpredictable risks. To fulfil
this duty, directors are given considerable discretion. In this context, the
law both guides and exculpates directors in the discharge of their fiduciary
duties and, in particular, the exercise of that discretion where purposes are
not clear or where benefits fail or negative contingencies may eventuate.
This conflict, then, is the foundation for directors' duties which encompass
the directors' decisions with respect to corporate actions, including those
actions that concern CSR.
24. It has been observed that
[o]ver time, state courts interpreted the [fiduciary] duties in a manner that left little
substance. The business judgment rule and universal adoption of waiver of liability
provisions all but eliminated causes of action for breach of the duty of care. The duty
of loyalty, particularly self-dealing by officers and directors, could be validated through
procedural mechanisms. With proper procedures, the fairness of the transaction was not
subject to judicial review. This approach allowed self-dealing by officers and directors
almost without limits.
J Brown, "The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies" (2004)
38 U Rich L Rev 317 at 318-319.
25. See, e.g., chapter 4 in O'Kelley & Thompson, supra note 23, but see Graham v Allis-Chalmers
Mfg Co, 188 A(2d) 125 at 130 (Del Sup Ct 1963).
Anglo-American Directors' Legal Duties and 351
CSR: Prohibited, Permitted or Prescribed?
As noted, the article works through well-known principles and
doctrines. The point of the article is not to propose reform or to contest
those doctrines. Rather, the purpose is to place CSR within the existing
framework. The article begins with a review of fiduciary relations and
fiduciary duties. It then proceeds to an analysis of the components of the
directors' duty to exercise power in the best interests of the company as a
whole. That section is followed by an examination of the proper purpose
doctrine. Having examined these two fiduciary foundations of directors'
duties, the article turns to examine the cases advanced as precluding
CSR and those in which CSR concerns have been permitted. The section
following this examination of the cases examines the legislated duties
relevant to the fiduciary obligations imposed on directors. The final section
examines the role of the business judgment rule and the role internal
governance rules may play in directors' decision-making and CSR.
I. Fiduciary relationships and fiduciary duties
Fiduciary relationships in commerce are -no different than they are
elsewhere in the law. The relationship, as stated in Hospital Products Ltd.
v. United States Surgical Corporation, is:
[Olne of confidence, which may be abused... [where there] is an inequality
of bargaining power. .. [where] the fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act
for or on behalf of or in the interests of another person in the exercise of a
power or discretion which will affect the interests of that other person in a
legal or practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore
one which gives the fiduciary a special opportunity to exercise the power
or discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly
vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of this position.2 6
Where a fiduciary relationship is found to exist, the law imposes fiduciary
duties to protect the vulnerable party. These duties are to act in good faith,
in the interests of the beneficiary, and not to abuse the powers and position
of the fiduciary.27 These same duties are imposed on company directors, as
a class, in relation to the company.
As Lord Cranworth LC in his classic statement of the obligation of
corporate directors put it:
The Directors are a body to whom is delegated the duty of managing the
general affairs of the Company. A corporate body can only act by agents,
and it is of course the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote
the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting. Such
26. (1984), 55 ALR 417 at 454 (HLA) [Hospital Products].
27. Boardman v Phipps, [1967] 2 AC 46 HL (Eng).
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agents have duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature towards their
principal.2"
In the American context, the widely accepted statement of fiduciary duties
in commercial relations comes from a joint venture case. In that case,
Meinhard v. Salmon, Cardozo opined:
Joint adventurers.., owe to one another.. .the duty of finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee
is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not
honesty alone, but the punctilio of honor the most sensitive is then the
standard of behaviour.29
Accordingly, the basic evaluation of exercise of directors' discretion with
respect to CSR must fall within the fiduciary obligations just outlined.
These obligations are quite general and do not provide adequate parameters
to address something as specific as CSR. The next section of the article
moves the argument further by providing an analysis of the law pertaining
to the object of the fiduciary duties.
1I. To whom are fiduciary duties owed?
There are, in essence, three distinct alternatives for the status of beneficiary
of corporate directors' fiduciary duty. These are: the organization or
enterprise as a going concern, the stakeholders generally including
shareholders, or the shareholders specifically to the exclusion of all
other constituents. As will be argued throughout this article all three are
potentially correct; however, it depends upon the particulars of the case.
First, the usual case requires directors to focus the exercise of their
discretion on the company as a whole, to keep the enterprise operating to
maximize the overall value of the enterprise. 30 This focus allows shareholder
wealth to be maximized as a by-product of successful management of
the enterprise as a going concern. This focus, as opposed to the view of
exclusive shareholder wealth maximizing at all times, is consistent with
other law that imposes limits on shareholder wealth maximization.3' In
28. AberdeenRlvyCovBlaikieBros(1854), 1 Macq 461 at 471 (HL Scot).
29. Meinhard v Salmon, 164 NE 545 at 546 (NYApp Ct 1928).
30. Thomas A Smith, "The Efficient Norm fo Corporate Law: A Neotraditional interpretation of
Fiduciary Duty" (1999) 98 Mich L Rev 214; N Licht, supra note 10. This is Jensen's argument:
Michael C Jensen, "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function"
(2001) 7 European Financial Management Review 297.
31. For example, securities law prohibits market manipulation that may maximize shareholder
wealth. See discussion in Matthew T Bodie, "AOL Time Wamer and the False God of Shareholder
Primacy" (2006) 31 J Corp L 975.
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this case, it is understood that as fiduciaries, directors owe their duties
to the company and not to the shareholders. The classic statement of this
position is in Percival v. Wright.32 In the U.S.A., in the case of Northeast
Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, the doctrine has been explicated most
clearly.33 The court requires "full disclosure to the appropriate corporate
body,"34 not necessarily shareholders at all. Accordingly, arguments. that
directors breach their duties by misappropriating shareholder wealth in
the implementation of CSR are incorrect. This point will be argued more
fully below.
This position is.clarified by the duty of proper purpose, which focuses
the object of directors' attention on the company. It focuses on the company
as the beneficiary of the duty by explicitly excluding purposes foreign to
the affairs, operations and organization of the company. In other words,
purposes that do not advance the company are precluded by law. 5 This
approach is evident in Walker v. Wimborne,36 where Mason explained:
[D]irectors of a company in discharging their duty to the company must
take account of the interests of its shareholders and its creditors. Any
failure by the directors to take into account the interests of creditors will
have adverse consequences for the company as well as for them.37
The rule laid down in Walker v. Wimborne has been adopted in Lonhro
Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. that "the best interests of the company...
are not exclusively those of its shareholders but may include those of its
creditors. ' 38 This understanding of the object of directors' duty clearly
encompasses CSR, as it is clear from this judgment that non-shareholders
32. Percival v Wright, [1902] 2 Ch 421 [Percival].
33. That case both consolidated earlier judicial thinking and moved beyond the prior standards of
Guth v Loft, Inc, 5 A(2d) 503 (Del Sup Ct 1939), the "line of business test," the Durfee v Durfee &
Canning, Inc, 323 Mass 187 at 199, 80 NE (2d) 522, 529 (Mass Sup Ct 1948) "fairness test," as well
as the effort to consolidate the two in Miller v Miller, 301 Min 207 at 222. The Northeast court rejected
all of these prior cases because of the inability of those cases to capture the fundamental breach of
duty to the corporation, Which could only be exposed and dealt with fairly and adequately where there
had been full disclosure to the corporation. The court adopted the American Law Institute's Principle
of Corporate Governance (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 2008) at para 5.05, which requires
"full disclosure to the appropriate corporate body.. .an absolute condition precedent" to the defences
that the company rejected the opportunity for any reason including line of business, or that the action
of the director amounts to a lack of fairness, and as applied in Klinicki v Lundgren 695 P (2d) 906 (Or.
Sup Ct 1985) [Klinicki].
34. Klinicki, ibid.
35. JP Heydon, "Directors' Duties, and the Company's Interests" in PD Finn, ed, Equity and
Commercial Relationships (North Ryde, NSW: Lam Book Co, 1987) 122. See also O'Kelley &
Thompson, supra note 23.
36. (1976), 137 CLR I (MCA) [Walker].
37. Ibid.
38. Lonhro Ltdv Shell Petroleum Co Ltd, [1980] 1 WLR627 at 634, HL (Eng) [LonhroLtd].
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can be included in the sphere of concern without breaching the fiduciary
duty. Indeed, there is a positive duty upon directors to consider non-
shareholder constituents-at least in some instances.
The second view is similar to the first, and can be illustrated by reference
to Blair and Stout's team production theory.39 Simply put, Blair and Stout
argue that directors are to use their discretion to mediate the stakeholder
hierarchy within the firm to maximize the overall enterprise value, Which
may ultimately benefit shareholders. In this view, directors are required
by law to balance the competing interests of stakeholders both with and
external to the firm through a range of liabilities from employment law,
to environmental law, to creditors. In the particular context of the vicinity
of insolvency, directors are required to shift the focus of their duties away
from shareholders and other internal interests toward the interests of
creditors. Shareholders' interests are subordinated to those of other parties.
This approach requires the fiduciary to exercise his or her powers
in relation to all persons or stakeholders associated with the company.
This conception of the duty, while clearly the most amenable to CSR,
must still be subjected to a positive law analysis. The interests that are
the objects of the directors' duty are typically understood to range from
creditors, to employees, to people in the community. The duty to these
other non-shareholder constituents typically arises in different contexts.
In the first instance, with respect to creditors, the court in Speis v. R40
clarified the nature of the duty. The court held that the duty to creditors is
not an on-going duty, but a contingent duty that arises as the prospect of
insolvency emerges. Further, as the duty provides creditors with no cause
of action against directors, it is an "imperfect obligation."'4 1 The situation
is different in Canada where no obligation to creditors arises, although
they may be considered. 42 In the U.S.A. the situation has changed recently.
While previously the court had held that once the corporation approaches
insolvency, or is in the "vicinity of insolvency," there is a fiduciary duty to
creditors, 43 recent case law has denied that obligation.'
39. Margaret Blair & Lynne Stout, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law" (2001) 85 Va L
Rev 247.
40. [2000] 18 ACLC 727 [HCA].
41. Re New World Alliance Pty Ltd; Sycotex Pty Ltd v Baseler, (1994) 122 ALR 531 at 550, cited in
Walker, supra note 36 at 94.
42. B Reiter, Directors' Duties in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 2006) at 59; Brian
Morgan & Harry Underwood, "Directors' Liability to Creditors on a Corporation's Insolvency in Light
of the Dylex and Peoples Department Stores Litigation" (2003) 39 Can Bus LJ 336.
43. Geyer v Ingersoll Publishing Co, 621 A (2d) 784 at 787-790 (Del Ch 1992).
44. North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc v Gheewalla, 2007 WL
1453705 (Del Sup Ct).
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Further, the directors' duties and hence the company's borders are
expanded beyond the narrower interests of shareholders to employees. For
example, although it is not commonly part of the law of corporations per
se,45 it is clear that directors have duties to employees in Australia.4 6 In
the U.S.A., by way of statutes and case law,47 directors have an obligation
to employees, again, particularly in the context of insolvency.48 These
acts may criminalize efforts by directors to avoid paying employee
entitlements. A similar provision is found in the CBCA. 49 Directors' duties
are also extended to employees via workplace safety laws.50
Beyond obligations to employees, directors' duties extend beyond
the company to the environment.5 Environmental protection laws extend
directors' liabilities and hence their duties even beyond the corporation,
its shareholders and employees, to the community in which it resides
and operates. Personal liability for taxes, torts, general compliance and
even criminality support a view that opposes subordination of all interests
to those of shareholders, as does directors' right to make charitable
donations. 2
As stated in Harlowe 's Nominees Pty Ltd. v. Woodside (Lakes
Entrance) Oil Company NL:
Directors in whom are vested the right and the duty of deciding where the
company's interests lie and how they are to be served may be concerned
with a wide range of practical considerations, and their judgment, if
exercised in good faith and not for irrelevant purposes, is not open to
review in the courts.
53
45. Companies Act 1993 (NZ), 1993/105, s 132. New Zealand's legislation is an exception to this
general approach.
46. Corporations Law Amendment Act (Employee Entitlements) Act 2000 (Cth).
47. Stafford v Purofied Down Production Corp, 801 F Supp 130 (ND II1 1992). Additionally,
directors may be liable for delinquent pension contributions. See Plumbers'Pension Fund, Local 130
v Niedrich, 891 F (2d) 1297 (7th Cir 1989); NY Lab Law § 198-a.
48. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, NV v Pathe Communications Corp, 1991 WL 277613 at 34
(Del CL). There is some question, nonetheless, as to the "zone of insolvency" test from Kipperman v
Onex Corp, 411 Br 805 (ND Ga 2009).
49. CBCA, supra note 23, s 119.
50. See, e.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic).
51. See, e.g., Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic), s 20C(3), or Canada's Environmental
Protection Act, RSC 1999, c 33, s 273. For discussion of the US position, see Geoffrey Christopher
Rapp, "A New Direction for Shareholder Environmental Activism: The Aftermath of Caremark"
(2006) Wm & Mary Envtl L & Pol'y Rev 163.
52. AP Smith Mfg Co v Barlow, 98 A (2d) 581 (NJ Sup Ct 1953) [Smith and Barlow]; Faith
Stevelman Kahn, "Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy"
(1997) 44 UCLA L Rev 579; Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, "Corporate Charitable Giving" (2002)
69 U Chicago L Rev -1191.
53. [1968] 121 CLR 483 at 493 [Harlowe's].
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The third interpretation of the duty is shareholder primacy-here defined
as a broad focus on the shareholders as a whole. A version of shareholder
primacy that requires maximizing shareholder wealth to the exclusion
of all other interests is an economic norm that is generally not reflected
in law except, as argued below, in the case of takeovers. Much of the
discussion of this latter version of shareholder primacy is a political and
ideological debate about the desirability of following the economic norms
associated with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, preferencing wealth generation
over fairness in distribution and other norms.14
In Ngurli v. McCann, the High Court held, citing with approval the
judgment of Evershed MR:
[P]owers conferred on directors by the articles of association of
companies must be used bona fide for the benefit of the company as a
whole...the phrase 'company as a whole', does not mean the company
as a commercial entity, distinct from the corporators: it means the
corporators as a general body.5
Here, the shareholders are emphasized, but what is expected of
shareholders? Evershed's answers might be considered bizarre if the
fact pattern of the case is not understood. He. states, "the shareholder
must proceed upon what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the
company as a whole."56 The High Court continues, explaining what this
means and how it applies in the context of the case. The case actually deals
with minority oppression in which a director, who was also a majority
shareholder by operation of law, was using his power to take control of
the company. In other words, the shareholder's interest comes to the fore
in a case of oppression-indeed, it is as a result of the harm of oppressive
conduct that the (any) shareholder gets the right of the oppression remedy
that is appropriately attached to directors' duties. The area of oppression
is an important one in the discussion of shareholder primacy generally and
directors' discretion to provide benefits to non-shareholder constituencies,
as will be discussed in various sections below, and in some detail in the
section dealing with the so-called hard cases.
The American law, despite many protestations to the contrary, is
unclear. In Delaware, the leading corporate law jurisdiction, the law refers
54. Licht, supra note 10; Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, "The Illusion Of Law: The Legitimating
Schemas Of Modem Policy And Corporate Law" (2004) 103 Mich L Rev I; Kent Greenfield, The
Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005).
55. Ngurli v McCann, [1953] 90 CLR 425 at 438 [Ngurli], citing Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas
Ltd, [1951] Ch 286 at 291.
56. Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd, [1951] Ch 286 at 291.
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sometimes to "the corporation and its shareholder" and at other times, to the
"corporation" only. The significance of the distinction is debated5 7-some
arguing it is significant, others to the contrary-but in the first instance
it would seem most consistent with principles of statutory interpretation
that the distinction is meaningful. The basic principle of surplusage is that
each word or phrase in the statute is meaningful and useful, and thus, an
interpretation that makes a distinction is to be favoured, and an interpretation
that would render a word or phrase redundant or meaningless should be
rejected." Following this principle, it would appear that the two uses are
to be distinguished and the better approach would be an interpretation .that
allows for a legal organization operating an enterprise on the one hand,
and shareholder-members who have rights in the legal organization on the
other.59 Further, it should be noted that in this context, the statute never
refers only to "shareholder" without "corporation." It is proper therefore
to infer that the two should not be treated as interchangeable. A better
interpretation is that the fiduciary duty is first to the corporation, which at
times can be seen as identical to those of the shareholders, or whose interests
at times may be interchangeable. However, such a position is inconsistent
with the view discussed in greater detail below that shareholder primacy
means at all times and in all instances, shareholders short-term interests
are the whole of directors' duties. If that were the case, why bother with
the term "corporation" at all?
Thus, regardless of how one conceives of the object or recipient of
fiduciary obligations, CSR is clearly within the accepted interpretations
of the fiduciary duty in most instances. In some ways, it may be said that
CSR, rather than being a discrete corporate agenda, is a core aspect of
directors' duties that increases as the needs and demands of society change.
Indeed, this view of the reality of corporate power and responsibility in
contemporary society driving change in corporate law norms is found in
the case law. As Berger J opined in Teck Corp. Ltd. v. Millar:
[A] classical theory that once was unchallengeable must yield to the
facts of modem life. In fact, of course, it has. If today the directors of a
company were to consider the interests of its employees no one would
57. Christopher M Bruner, "The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law" (2008) 59 Ala L Rev
1385;'David Millon, "Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility" (2011) 46 Wake Forest L Rev
523; Andrew S Gold, "Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty" (2012) 35 Seattle UL Rev 1087;
Yosifon, supra note 4.
58. William N Eskridge et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of
Public Policy, 3rd ed (St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 2001) at 833.
59. A position which accords with my reading of Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd v Pillsbury Co, 558
A(2d) 1049 (Del Ch 1988); TWServices, Inc vSWTAcquisition Corp, 1989 WL 20290 (Del Ch); and,
Paramount Communications, Inc v Time, Inc 571 A (2d) 1140 (Del Sup Ct 1989) [Paramount].
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argue that in doing so they were not acting bona fide in the interests
of the company itself. Similarly, if the directors were to consider the
consequences to the community of any policy that the company intended
to pursue, and were deflected in their commitment to that policy as a
result, it could not be said that they had not considered bona fide the
interests of the shareholders... if they observe a decent respect for other
interests lying beyond those of the company's shareholders in the strict
sense, that will not, in my view, leave directors open to the charge that
they have failed in their fiduciary duty to the company.6"
In sum, the law offers four potential beneficiaries of directors' fiduciary
duties. These are the company, the company with interests more sharply
defined, shareholders and stakeholders. First, it is understood that as
fiduciaries, directors owe their duties to the company and not to the
shareholders. This view does not preclude CSR. The second focuses on the
company as the beneficiary of the duty by explicitly excluding purposes
foreign to the affairs, operations and organization. Interestingly, the case
law on this approach has specified particular interests that are to be taken
into account. A third interpretation of the duty focuses on the shareholders
as a whole. Such an interpretation, while potentially precluding CSR, need
not do so. Indeed, the law, as shall be argued in detail below, empowers
directors to move beyond shareholder interests into charitable giving.
The fourth approach requires the fiduciary to exercise his or her powers
in relation to all persons or stakeholders associated with the company.
This approach is wholly consistent with CSR, where CSR is understood
to be granting benefits to non-shareholder constituents. Again, as shall
be demonstrated below, law imposes such a duty on directors. Thus,
regardless of which object one selects as the object of the duty, the duty
is not inconsistent with CSR. Indeed, law mandates CSR in a number of
situations, while only prohibiting it in a few.
With this overview of the nature and object of the duty, we now turn to
examine the specifics of the core fiduciary duty-the duty to act bona fide
for the company as a whole.
III. Duty to act bona fide for the company as a whole
This duty, to act bona fide for the company as a whole, is the core corporate
directors' duty. It makes in the first instance reference to good faith. While
the better interpretation is objective-i.e. "genuine"--the courts have also
60. Teck Corp v Millar (1972), 33 DLR (3d) 288 (BCSC) at 314 [Teck Corp] and cited with approval
in Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6 at para 42.
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interpreted it subjectively to mean "with the best of intentions."'" As to the
latter interpretation, it is well understood that good faith, as a subjective
concept, is not readily measureable. Rather, it is an approach toward
evaluating action and decision-making, something intangible, altruistic
and other-oriented. This orientation toward the other is a true hallmark
of the fiduciary-able to affect the legal relations of another party and
being obligated to do so in that other party's best interests. To hold this
position and discharge the duty requires the holder to act in good faith not
only in the objective sense of genuine, but subjectively with intent of the
other's benefit. Although it is evident from the foregoing and the cases
which follow that the duty cannot be broken up into it discrete elements
for purposes of application,62 for purposes of analysis of its application
to CSR, it is helpful to attempt to do so. There are three parts to the duty:
bona fide, benefit of the company, and company as a whole. Each of these
will be considered in turn.
1. Bonafide
The first part of the duty, to act bona fide, has caused confusion in company
law because it has been separated from the rest of the phrase "in the
interests of the company as a whole. '63 Properly it must be connected to
the phrase to set parameters for the investigation and to avoid an irrelevant
investigation into subjective intent and honesty. The standard test set out in
Mills v. Mills,64 is that the bona fide exercise of fiduciary powers precludes
use for self-interest or a purpose foreign to that for which it was granted. 65
Simply put, bona fide or good faith requires the best interests of company
and not some collateral purpose.66 Bona fide includes a general law duty of
honesty and also the exercise of independent judgment concerning what
precisely the best interests of the company are.67 As a result, in the first
instance, bona fide does not preclude CSR; rather, it sets the parameters.
As the court stated in Howard Smith Ltd. v. Ampol Petroleum Ltd.68:
61. Sealy, supra note 22 at 269. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of "good faith" see
Benedict Sheehy, "Good Faith in the CISG: Interpretation. Problems in Article 7" Pace International
Law Review, ed, Review of the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)
(Munich: Sellier European Law, 2005) 153.
62. Peters'American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath, [1939] 61 CLR 457 (HCA).
63. Sealy, supra note 22 at 269
64. [1938] 60 CLR 150 (HCA) [Mills v Mills].
65. Adopted in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, [1974] AC 821 (PC) [Howard Smith Ltd].
66. Hospital Products, supra note 26.
67. Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment & Trading Co Ltd, [ 1988] 14 ACLR 569.
68. Howard Smith Ltd, supra note 65.
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To define in advance exact limits beyond which directors must not pass
is, in their Lordships' view, impossible. This clearly cannot be done by
enumeration, since the variety of situations facing directors of different
types of company in different situations cannot be anticipated.69
As a matter of law, where bona fide is found to exist, the law offers
directors protection: "[i]t would be wrong for the court to substitute its
opinion for that of the management, or indeed to question the correctness
of the management's decision, on such a question, if bona fide arrived
at."70
. In sum, the bona fide requirement does not preclude CSR, and as noted
above, may very well include it.
2. For the company
The second part of the duty precludes the exercise of powers for reasons
that are foreign to the organization and operations of the company. It is
not clear whether this duty means that the "company as a whole"-i.e. the
organization or enterprise-is distinct from or distinguishable from the
shareholders. Further, it is unclear whether in referring to the organization,
it includes shareholders, or even other stakeholders who may include
creditors.7'
In a decision that has sparked much controversy,72 the Supreme Court
of Canada opined in BCE Ltd. v. 1976 Debenture as follows:
Often the interests of shareholders and stakeholders are co-extensive with
the interests of the corporation. But if they conflict, the directors' duty
is clear - it is to the corporation. The fiduciary duty of the directors to
the corporation is a broad, contextual concept. It is not confined to short-
term profit or share value. Where the corporation is an ongoing concern,
it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation. The content of this
duty varies with the situation at hand. At a minimum, it requires the
directors to ensure that the corporation meets its statutory obligations.
But, depending on the context, there may also be other requirements. In
any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors is mandatory; directors
must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation.73
But, neither the duty to shareholders nor to the creditors is fiduciary. Lord
Diplock held: "best interests of the company... are not exclusively those
69. Ibidat835.
70. Ibidat835.
71. Walker, supra note 36.
72. Dietrich, supra note 7; Bradley, supra note 7; Fadel, supra note 5; VanDuzer, supra note 7;
Macintosh, supra note 7.
73. 2008 SCC 69 at paras 37-38, [2008] 3 SCR 560 [BCE Inc].
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of its shareholders but may include those of its creditors."74 Indeed, the
position is identical to Australian judicial interpretation. In the case of
Brunninghausen v. Galvanics the court held: "[t]he general principle that a
director's fiduciary duties are owed to the company and not to shareholders
is undoubtedly correct, and its validity is undiminished."75 The essence of
this aspect of the duty is to the company or corporation, a concept, which
despite at least a century of consideration, was not well settled in law. 76
What is clear from the case law is that the company, in most
interpretations, includes parties other than the member-shareholders.
Accordingly, a narrowly conceived duty focused on the shareholders
is incompatible with most understandings of the company. The better
understanding of the company includes non-shareholders. As a result,
it may well be argued that CSR was not precluded by the more widely
accepted, broader understanding of the company.
3. The company as a whole
The third element of the duty requires an inquiry into the meaning of the
"company as a whole," for the undisputed law is that directors have a duty
to pursue the best interests of the company as a whole. This obligation is
often interpreted in two ways: first as meaning the shareholders; or second,
as referring to a broader range of interests in which shareholders interests
are usually prioritised. Both positions are appropriately referred to as
"shareholder primacy"; however, within the scholarly community, there
is a wide range of opinions as to what the term "shareholder primacy"
means.
The failure to identify exactly what is meant by the term has led to
considerable confusion in the interpretation of a number of important
cases from Dodge v. Ford 77 to more recent cases such as Paramount
Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.," and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark.79 To some, shareholder primacy means that shareholder wealth
maximization is the goal of the corporation and the overarching directors'
74. Lonrho, supra note 38 at 634.
75. Brunninghausen v Galvanics, [ 1999] 17 ACLC 1247 at para 43, citing with approval Percival,
supra note 32.
76. Benedict Sheehy, "CSR, Theories of the Firm and Models of the Corporation," online: (2012)
SSRN <http://www.ssrn.com>; Benedict Sheehy, "The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic
And Jurisprudential Values And The Future Of Corporate Law" (2004) 2 DePaul Bus & Comm LJ 463
[Sheehy, "The Importance"].
77. Dodge v Ford Motor Company, (1919) 204 Mich 459 (Mich Sup Ct 1919) [Dodge v Ford].
78. Paramount, supra note 59.
79. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc v Newmark 16 A (3d) 1 (Del Ch 2010) [eBay Domestic Holdings].
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duty from which all others are derivative.8°Although it seems problematic to
suggestthat overall corporate wealth is readily equated to shareholder wealth,
its advocates equate the two without comment orjustification. To others, the
idea is somewhat weaker, not limiting shareholders' interests to shareholder
wealth. This slightly weaker version may be put thus: only shareholders'
interests are important to the exclusion of other constituencies. This
interpretation of shareholder primacy has two implications: one is
that shareholders may have non-wealth maximizing objectives such
as governance, political powers or control, and second, that other
stakeholders may be ignored. To other scholars, shareholder primacy is no
more than simply stating that among the legitimate and various interests
within the organization, those of shareholders are to be preferred.8 A final
interpretation of shareholder primacy is that shareholders' interests are the
basic reference point in all decision-making.
Conceptually, the meaning of shareholder primacy is ambiguous. It may
mean anything from the relatively uncontentious assertion that substantively
corporate law puts the fundamental rights of corporate structure in the
hands of shareholders (common to all jurisdictions under consideration
in this article), to the American positive analysis that shareholders have
priority among the stakeholders-i.e. that corporate decisions must in
some way benefit shareholders, to the normative argument that corporate
law should favour shareholders as a result of equitable doctrine and
conceptions of the corporation as private law. Although this latter view
is common to many corporate law scholars, shareholder primacy is taken
further among law and economics scholars. To them it is an expression of
the economic normative argument that efficiency (for investors) should be
the goal of corporate law. To some shareholder primacy goes even beyond
that and becomes part of an overall ideology-we live in the best of all
worlds having found the ultimate destiny which brings history to an end in
an economic ideology 82 -a view that is equally derided by others in both
law 3 and business.84 Thus, to state shareholder primacy is the foundation
of corporate law without defining the term is problematic. Shareholder
80. This is Hansmann and Kraakman's view: Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10; Stephen M
Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008) at 53; and Yosifon, supra note 4.
81. Smith, supra note 21 at 323.
82. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 10.
83. Rotman, supra note 11; Winkler, supra note 11; Easterbrook & Fischel, "Pangloss meets the
Coase Theorem" (1992) 105 Harv L Rev 1408.
84. Robert Teitelman, "Most cited: Shareholder governance as. accepted wisdom" The Deal
Economy (8 June 2012), online: The Deal Pipeline <http://www.thedeal.com/thedealeconomy/most-
cited-shareholder-govemance-as-accepted-wisdom.php#ixzz2VKx l Nc6M>.
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primacy does not equate the shareholders' interests with 'the company as
a whole.'
While it is uncontroversial to state that in all the jurisdictions discussed,
the structure of corporate law clearly favours the shareholders over all
other constituents, for example, by granting rights to shareholders to vote
on essential corporate decisions such as constitutional amendments, the
sale of substantially all of the assets, and winding up, it is another thing
to substitute the shareholder for the corporation itself. This overly broad
version of shareholder primacy equating shareholders to the company is
not instructive in terms of day-to-day operations. Business cannot be run
on the basis of shareholder interests alone as daily operations requires
the complexity of the balancing of competing claims in a dynamic
environment. Nevertheless, much of the leading corporate law and the
orthodox economic analysis takes this more extreme version, conflating
practical, positive and normative concepts into a single concept and
declaring that shareholder wealth maximization, to the exclusion of all
other non-shareholders, is operative, positive and normative corporate
law.85 This statement is not an accurate statement of the law in operative,
positive, or normative terms as shall be explained next. These conceptual
distinctions, although they may seem fine or merely semantic, are far from
it. Rather, eliding these concepts makes it difficult if not impossible to
determine when directors are overstepping their boundaries on the one
hand, or properly attending to their duties on the other. For example, is
a director who in one decision fails to prioritize short-term shareholder
wealth by attending to stakeholder concerns that have implications for the
long-term viability of the enterprise in breach of their duties? Identifying
and clarifying the concepts provides them with a brighter line with which
to guide their decisions.
First, in factual and practical terms, there are four issues. One is the
simple fact that the corporators are usually the directors. Second, directors
appear not to consider the interests of shareholders in their decision-
making.86 Third and more problematic, it now appears that the majority
of shareholders hold their shares for a mere matter of seconds-in the
U.S., 20-22 seconds to be precise. 7 To follow this line of inquiry in
85. Benedict Sheehy, "Shareholders, Unicorns and Stilts: An Analysis of Shareholder Property
Rights" (2006) 6 JCLS 165.
86. Smith, supra note 21.
87. Michael Hudson, cited in Paul Farrow, "How long does the average share holding last? Just
22 seconds" (18 January 2012), online: The Telegraph Group <http://www/michael-hudson.com>.
Hudson's statement on his own website is "a few seconds": Michael Hudson, "Euro-Bankers Demand
of Greece" (10 May 2012), online: Michael Hudson <http://michael-hudson.com.
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legal analysis, "what would the 22 second shareholder's interests be?"
is self-evidently absurd. This problem requires the court to engage in a
rather subjective imaginative exercise. It requires the court to imagine
a particular type of shareholder, then place itself in the position of that
shareholder, and then decide whether to challenge and replace directors'
business judgement-a task the courts have traditionally been loathe to
do. Fourth, assuming the court is persuaded to go down that path, there
are significant obstacles to identifying which specific shareholder, among
the remaining minority, the court ought to be imagining and taking into
consideration. Some courts have solved the problem by deferring the
interests of the long-term shareholder. In a case which continues to cause
concern in the academy, Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.,88
the court explicitly refused the wishes of shareholders to capitalize on a
significant premium Paramount was willing to pay. The court held that
Time's corporate culture was a value that the directors legitimately sought
to protect.
Professor Hu identified this problem over a decade ago: there is no
single shareholder interest as a reference point for directors or courts. 89
Long-term and short-term, or even short-selling shareholders (if one
chooses to include the latter category) have conflicting interests and law
does not provide any way to decide which interest is to be preferred.9"
Even if it is given that it is the "medium-term" shareholder whose interests
are to be pursued, as management scholars argue, it is still unclear what
those interests may be. Presume they are not interested in governance, or
any corporate affairs other than profit-an arguable point with fluctuations
in mergers and acquisitions activity as well as the increasing interest
among institutional investors in CSR and socially responsible investing
generally.9' Even with this presumption, one still needs to answer whether
that medium-term shareholder is interested in capital gain or income
stream growth.92
88. Paramount, supra note 59.
89. Henry TC Hu, "Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment" (1994) 38 UCLA
L Rev 277. See more recently, Bodie, supra note 31.
90. Bodie, Ibid.
91. United Nations, "Principles for Responsible Investment," online: PRI Associaiton <http://
www.unpri.org> [United Nations, PRI]; Benjamin Richardson, "From Fiduciary Duties to Fiduciary
Relationships for SRI: Responding to the Will of Beneficiaries" (2011) Journal of Sustainable Finance
and Investment 5; Benjamin Richardson, "Are Social Investors Influential?" (2012) 9 European
Company Law 183.
92. Hu, supra note 89.
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Second, the formulation of the duty that equates the company as a
whole to the interests of the shareholders is legally problematic.93 Although
directors may have to take shareholders' interests into consideration, as is
clear from the case of Ngurli v. McCann,94 directors owe legal duties to
several parties. In addition to the corporation, which is the main focus of
their duties, directors will owe duties to creditors, employees and even
wider society. In fact, it is only upon the rarest occasions that directors
have a duty to shareholders themselves. Indeed, the law allows them
to make decisions directly in opposition to the wishes of the majority
of shareholders. 95 This particular and explicit rejection of shareholder
primacy sets non-American law onto a different trajectory.96
For example, in Teck Corp. Ltd. v. Millar, the court allowed directors to
reject awarding a contract to the majority shareholder, Teck The directors
instead awarded it to another mine developer which would ultimately
frustrate Teck's ability to gain control of the company. The board, once
it became aware of Teck's advancing bid, acted quickly and specifically
entered into the contract to thwart Teck. Teck claimed that the directors
were actuated by an improper purpose. Berger J of the BC Supreme Court
stated:
[M]y own view is that the directors ought to be allowed to consider who
is seeking control and why. If they believe that there will be substantial
damage to the company's interests if the company is taken over, the
exercise of their powers to defeat those seeking a majority will not
necessarily be categorised as improper .... [I]n seeking to prevent Teck
obtaining the contract, the defendant directors were honestly pursuing
what they thought was the best policy for the company.. .they wanted
to see the company's principal asset, its copper property, developed
efficiently and profitably." 97
What is interesting in thisjudgment is that the company is clearly not equated
with the shareholders at all. On the contrary, the company is viewed as an
entity and an enterprise with its own objectives.98 The interesting argument
93. This is one of Welling's objections to CSR. Bruce Welling, "Corporate Social Responsibility
-A Well-Meaning But Unworkable Concept," online: Corporate Governance ejournal <http://www.
epublications.bond.edu.au>.
94. Ngurli, supra note 55. As noted above, the case is a minority oppression case and does not mean
shareholder primacy; rather, in a parallel to D Gordon Smith's interpretation of Dodge v Ford, supra
note 77, the court is dealing with the issue as an minority oppression.
95. Australian Metropolitan Life Assurance Co Ltd v Ure, [1923] 33 CLR 199 (HCA) [Australian
Metro].
96. Reiter, supra note 42 and rejected in the Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6 at para 42.
97. Teck Corp, supra note 60 at 330.
98. CMV Clarkson, "Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls" (1996) 59 Mod L Rev
557.
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by Smith is that it is the overall claims on the corporation as a whole,
the overall value or wealth of the enterprise, which is the focus of the
directors' duties-not preferring shareholders, bond holders, stakeholders
or any other constituency.99
In the Supreme Court of Canada judgment in Peoples Department
Stores Inc. (Trustee oJ) v. Wise, Major and Deschamps JJ wrote:
We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether
[directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the corporation
it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given case, for the
board of directors to consider, inter. alia, the interests of shareholders,
employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment. 00
In the leading corporate law court of the world, Chancellor Allen of the
Delaware court identified the problem of focusing on the shareholder as
proxy for the interests of the company. He queried what interests must
be considered and how funds could be spent. He observed that the issue
becomes most pointed in the takeover context. He described it as follows:
[T]he issue in the takeover case was not whether a donation of
corporate funds could be made to a museum or college.. .the issue was
frequently. whether all of the shareholders would be permitted to sell
their shares, whether a change in corporate control would occur; and
often whether a radical restructuring of the enterprise would go forward,
with dramatic effects on creditors, employees, management, suppliers
and communities .... Whether a board of directors could take action that
precluded shareholders from accepting a non-coercive, all cash tender
offer.
He queried:
[W]hose interests is the board...supposed to foster and protect when
substantially all of the shareholders want to sell [their] control of the
corporation? The long-term/short-term distinction could not persuasively
be used to answer or evade that question... it is... a different thing to justify
precluding the shareholders from selling their stock at a large immediate
profit on the ground that in the long run that will be good for them... In
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc .... the Delaware Supreme
Court seems to have expressed the view that corporate directors, if they
act in pursuit of some vision of the corporation's long-term welfare, may
take action that precludes shareholders from accepting an immediate
high-premium offer for their shares.'
99. Smith, supra note 30. A view that is consistent with Jensen, supra note 30.
100. Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6.
101. William T Allen, "Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation" (1992) 14
Cardozo L Rev 261 at 274-276.
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This statement by a leading jurist in the state that provides the lodestar
for corporate law and litigation is quite clear: CSR cannot be precluded
on the grounds of shareholder interest and shareholder interests cannot
be taken to stand as proxy for the company. Determining the interests of
the company as a whole is better understood as distinct from the interests
of the shareholders. If the law intended the directors to owe a duty to
shareholders, it could easily have done so. However, it has explicitly
rejected such except in the rarest of circumstances. 102 In fact, the current
position is a position that has evolved from the earlier position of directors
as shareholders' agents in the joint stock company, to a position, via law
reform, approaching the other end of the spectrum. 103
Third, from a theoretical perspective there are also problems with
the formulation of the duty as a duty to the shareholders rather than
the corporate organized enterprise. Hard shareholder primacy places
shareholder wealth generation ahead of all other objectives for a variety
of normative, theoretical and operational purposes, essentially seeking to
solve the agency problem by incentivizing directors by compensating them
in (hopefully increasingly valuable) shares.' There are fundamental flaws
in the underlying assumptions which are fatal to this model.105 The basic
assumptions are as follows: that companies are rational organizations, that
directors act rationally, that share value reflects actual productivity and
that shares are traded in rational markets. On these-assumptions, increases
in shareholder value will represent underlying productivity gains, real
revenue streams, and well-managed assets. Not only are these assumptions
untrue-as countless scandals and the recent financial crisis clearly
indicate--directors themselves are not nearly as focused on shareholder
wealth maximization as the literature would suggest.10 6
As the late professor of sociology and law, Phillip Selznick points out,
even if the aggregate of shareholders is the point of reference, it is clear
that no single individuals are held in mind. He states:
102. Coleman v Myers, [1977] 2 NZLR 225 (NZCA).
103. Argued by Bainbridge as "Director Primacy" Stephen M Bainbridge, "Director Primacy and
Shareholder Disempowerment" (2006) 119 Harv L Rev 1735.
104. MJ Roe, "The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization" (2000) 149
U Pa L Rev 2063; Smith, supra note 21.
105. For an excellent critique, see Lynn Stout, "Bad and not-so-bad arguments for shareholder
primacy" (2001) 75 S Cal L Rev 1189.
106. Phil Rosenzweig, The Halo Effect: ...and the Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive
Managers (New York: Free Press, 2007); Amitai Aviram, "What Do Corporate Directors Maximize?
(Not Quite What Everybody Thinks)" (2010) 6 Journal of Institutional Economics 47; John C Coffee,
"Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance" (1984) 84 Colum L Rev 1145; Richard Roll, "The Hubris Hypothesis of
Corporate Takeovers" (1986) 59 The Journal of Business 197.
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The important point is that decision making in the light of long-run benefits
presumes a concept of the institution. The enterprise as a going concern,
as a relational entity, becomes the focus of policy and strategy.. .it has to
do with all the empirical requirements of organizational survival.. .these
requirements become operative goals. 107
In other words, the purpose for which the power is being exercised is for
the benefit of the organization, not some hypothetical shareholder and
from a director's or CEO's perspective the survival of the organization,
which includes the survival of the CEO and other senior members of the
enterprise, is contingent upon such an understanding and not a hypothetical
shareholder.
In summary, the law does not impose a duty on directors to the
shareholder except in the particular context of takeovers discussed in
detail below." 8 Rather, the duty is to the corporation-and the debate then
turns as to what or who best represents the corporation? The corporation's
survival may be the goal and indeed, if one looks at other aspects of the
law, such as creditor administrations and re-structuring, this perspective
makes considerable sense. Evidently, the law requires directors to consider
a range of matters in their decision-making in addition to shareholder
interests. Indeed, directors are negligent if they fail to do so. °9 It is a
breach of directors' duties to fail to use care, skill and diligence in making
decisions-a shortcut heuristic "shareholder interest" is not only a cognitive
error,"' but a fallacy in the understanding and application of legal duties."'
In light of the foregoing, the obligation on directors is not to maximize
shareholder wealth; rather, it is the well-being of the corporation that may
well require foregoing shareholder wealth to pursue other objectives." 2
107. Phillip Selznick, La, Society and Industrial Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969)
at 47.
108. Chen & Hanson, supra note 54.
109. Joe (Chip) Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility--A LegalAnalysis (Markham, ON: LexisNexis,
2009).
110. Chen & Hanson, supra note 54.
111. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada case BCE Inc, supra note 73, which held that "the
corporation's duties as a responsible corporate citizen" are to be included in directors' decision-making.
That case followed an earlier case in which the same court held a permissive approach to integrated,
sustainable decision-making was appropriate (Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6). In Australia
a Parliamentary Joint Committee took the view that corporate law "permits directors to have regard
for the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders" (Austl, Commonwealth, Parliamentary Joint
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Corporate Responsibility: Managing risk and
creating value (Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, 2006) and noted Australian corporate law scholars note
the array of candidates and discussion on the topic (RP Austin et al, Company Directors: Principles of
Law and Corporate Governance (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 50-54).
112. Benedict Sheehy, "Scrooge-The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in The
Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate" (2005) 14 U Miami Bus L Rev 193.
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. The argument is not that shareholders or profit maximization are to be
ignored. As Ruder argued in 1965 that:
[R]eliance upon traditional profit maximization theory does not amount
to a rejection of modem day notions of corporate responsibility. Within
the confines of the business judgment rule there is ample opportunity
for expenditure of corporate funds upon worthwhile public welfare
measures. The only limitation is that corporate policy must be reasonably
related to long-term corporate profit."
3
The great fear of neoclassical economic conservative commentators in
the business press as well as the academy," 4 that such discretion would
lead to rampant abuse of directors' powers, has not eventuated, as will be
discussed below in the section dealing with legislation." 5
It is clear from the foregoing that the duty to act bona fide for the
company as a whole, far from precluding CSR, makes considerable room
for it. CSR may well guide decision-making by the board of directors
as a demonstration of bona fides, both subjectively and objectively.
Further, contrary to the view that CSR is incompatible with the company
as a whole, CSR is wholly consistent with developing case law in the
area. Accordingly, it may well be the correct position that law mandates
imposing on directors a duty to take a CSR approach.
Having examined the law's concern with the organization and its
enterprise, and seeing that CSR is wholly compatible with, if not a better
interpretation of directors' duty to the company as a whole, we now turn
to examine in detail the specific nature of the second aspect of directors'
fiduciary duty, the duty to act for a proper purpose.
IV. Duty ofproper purpose
The duty of proper purpose deals with the reasons for which directors
exercise discretion. The determination of whether a director has breached
this fiduciary duty will hinge on whether the power has been exercised
for a proper purpose. What exactly are the proper purposes for which the
exercise of the powers is legal?
The courts have established a two step analysis. Firstly, there is an
analysis of the power, followed secondly, by an analysis of whether it was
exercised for proper purposes.
113. David Ruder, "Public Obligations of Private Corporations" (1965) 14 U Pa L Rev 209 at 223.
114. Licht, supra note 10.
115. Jonathan D Springer, "Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears" (1999)
85 Ann SurvAm L.
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The procedure was set out by Lord Wilberforce in Howard Smith Ltd.
v. Ampol Petroleum"16:
It is necessary to start with a consideration of the power whose exercise
is in question... [and] having ascertained, on a fair view, the nature
of this power, and having defined as can best be done in the light of
.modem conditions the...limits within which it may be exercised, it is
then necessary.. .to examine the substantial purpose for which it was
exercised, and to reach a conclusion whether that purpose was proper
or not. "7
In determining the substantial purpose, the court does not ignore that
potentially conflicting purposes may exist, including directors' self-
interest. The court will find a proper purpose so long as the motivating
or substantial purpose is not a prohibited interest-i.e. a manifestation
of disloyalty. As opined in Mills v. Mills, it is "not required by the law
[that directors]... live in an unreal region of detached altruism and to act
in the vague mood of ideal abstraction from obvious facts which must be
present to the mind of any honest and intelligent man when he exercises
his powers as a director."' 8 And further,
When the law makes the object...or purpose of a body of men, the test
of the validity of their acts, it necessarily opens up the possibility of an
almost infinite analysis of the fears and desires, proximate and remote,
which, in truth, form the compound motives usually animating human
conduct. 19
Thus the law recognises a range of motives, conflicts and dynamics in the
experience of everyday life. It does not lay down a hard and narrow line in
its conception of human nature, at least in this instance.
Rather, the director may well have an interest. However, as Ipp J, of
the High Court of Australia put it, if one is to impugn a director's decision,
"[i]t must be shown that the substantial purpose of the directors was
improper or collateral to their duties as directors of the company. This
issue is not whether a management decision was good or bad; it is whether
the directors acted in breach of their fiduciary duties."' 2° This supports
the view that directors may well exercise discretion to engage in CSR,
contrary to the views of some scholars who believe that such directors'
exercise of decision-making power is contrary to law.
116. Howard Smith Ltd, supra note 65.
117. Ibidat835.
118. Mills v Mills, supra note 64.
119. Ibid at 185.
120. Permanent Building Society (in liq,) v Wheeler, [1994] 12 ACLC 674 at 676-677 (WASC).
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The proper purposes analysis is undertaken primarily in three contexts
that place a focus on the shareholder. These contexts are: where a share
issue is challenged,121 registration or transfer of shares 122 and transactions
undertaken for a collateral purpose-often for the purpose of defeating a
takeover bid (discussed in detail in the next section). 123 In all of these cases,
the same overriding issue comes to the fore: was the exercise of the power
done for a proper purpose-i.e. for the benefit of the company? In those
cases, shareholders often take to the courts to protect their interests. Yet,
in these cases, unless the shareholder plaintiff proves otherwise, the courts
will accept that the directors acted for a proper purpose, such purpose being
in the interests of the beneficiary of the fiduciary duty, the company. Using
the principles of CSR as guides for the exercise of discretion in directing a
company, directors are most unlikely to fall afoul of their duties to act for
a proper purpose. Rather, the maximizing of the overall wealth claims on
the company is in fact best done by pursuing a CSR strategy. Thus, CSR,
far from being an improper purpose, is well within the acceptable purposes
of the directors' discretionary powers.
V. CSR: the hard cases and the applied cases
There are a group of cases that some law scholars declare preclude directors'
use of corporate resources for non-profit activities for the benefit of non-
shareholder constituencies. These cases, because of the weight given and
interpretations drawn, merit further examination. The first case we will
examine is .the case of Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co.' 24 In that case
the court reversed a directors' decision to provide benevolence toward
employees. Bowen LJ's oft repeated statement of the law is used to argue
that law does not permit benevolence with company assets. Bowen stated:
"[tihe law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but that there
are to be no cakes and ale except such as are.requiredfor the benefit of the
company."' 25 This felicitous anachronism has drawn attention away from
the real issue in the case. The judgment in that case turned not on whether
the company could do such acts. As Bowen LJ put it:
121. Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Party Limited, [1987] 162 CLR 285 (HCA); Howard Smith Ltd,
supra note 65; Harlowe's, supra note 53; Mills v Mills, supra note 64.
122. Australian Metro, supra note 95; Ngurli, supra note 55; Re Smith & Favcett Ltd, [1992] 2 All
ER 542 CA [Eng] [Smith & Fawcett].
123. Darvall v North Sydney Brick & Tile Co, [1989] 15 ACLR 230 (NSWSC) [Darvall]; Pine Vale
Investments v McDonnell & East Ltd, [1983] 8 ACLR 199; Winthrop Investments v Winns, [1979] 4
ACLR 1 (NSWSC); Revlon, Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A (2d) 173 (Del Sup Ct
1986) [Revlon].
124. (1883) 23 IR 654 (Ch D) [Hutton].
125. Ibid at 672 [emphasis added].
372 The Dalhousie Law Journal
They [directors] are not to keep their pockets buttoned up and defy the
world unless they are liable in a way which could be enforced at law or
in equity... [the issue is] whether... it is done within the ordinary scope
of the company's business, and whether it is reasonably incidental to the
carrying on of the company's business for the company. 12 6
Rather, the prohibition against corporate benevolence arose from the
operational context-the termination of business.
The law lords in Hutton were at pains to point out that the answer
to the question turns on whether the company is a going concern or in
winding up. Further, they clearly distinguish shareholder interests as not
being the issue. Bowen opined:
The money which is going to be spent is not the money of the majority.
That is clear. It is the money of the company .... They can only spend
money which is not theirs but the company's, if they are spending it
for purposes which are reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the
business of the company.'27
Given that the company was being wound up and that the company
would have no need of an on-going work force, there was no basis for the
expenditure. Essentially the case is similar to a liquidation in that the cash
of the company must go to the legitimate expenses incurred. To use the
case to argue that CSR is prohibited by the ratio is to do violence to the
judicial reasoning. In fact, the case makes it clear that sums or resources
in addition to legal entitlements ought to be paid to labour as obviously in
the interests of the corporation. In the words of Bowen: "that sort of liberal
dealing with servants eases the friction.., and is, in the end, a benefit to the
company."'
128
A second case, Parke v. Daily News, 129 is one in which a newspaper
publisher was to be shut down. Upon the sale and closure of the business,
the directors decided to make an ex gratia payment to employees who
would no longer be working for the- corporation. The issue in the case,
however, is not about CSR, but about proper purposes. In that case the
court opined: "The view that directors... are entitled to take into account the
interests of the employees, irrespective of any consequential benefit to the
company... [has] no authority to support that proposition as a proposition
126. Ibid. This directive goes some distance to answering Welling's concern in his article, supra note
93.
127. Hutton, ibid at 671.
128. Ibid at 673.
129. [1962] Ch 927.
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of law[.] ' 130 Given that the facts of this case are quite similar to Hutton v.
West Cork Railway Co., it is unsurprising that the outcome was similar.
In the U.S.A., the case of Dodge v. Ford,31 which has been widely
used by scholars (though less so by the courts 13 2) as authority against
CSR, is similarly misunderstood.'33 Indeed, the case has been at the centre
of the debate for decades. The issue among scholars appears to be less
about directors' duties and shareholder primacy than about an unstated
assumption about the meaning of the term "shareholder primacy." As
alluded to above, where the term is taken to mean nothing but shareholder
wealth maximization and all else is a breach, then the case looks like
it stands for the proposition that directors can and must only maximize
wealth. Bainbridge and others who believe shareholder primacy means
only shareholder wealth maximization argue that Dodge stands for that
proposition. 134 They quote Ostrander J's statement "[a] business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employed for that end."' 35
Where "shareholder primacy" means simply a preference of
shareholders' interests ahead of the claims of other legitimate constituents,136
however, the case loses its power and significance. A different view of
shareholder primacy, one that is consistent with Blair and Stout's team
production model appears to be a better interpretation. It is explained by
D. Gordon Smith.
Smith's analysis of the case in his article on the doctrine of shareholder
primacy develops an interpretation that introduces an important historical
dimension that is not contained in the reported decision. Smith observes
that the doctrine of shareholder primacy 137 is really a precursor to the
contemporary law on minority oppression.38 In the historical context, the
case has little to say in terms of the focus of directors duties vis-a-vis the
corporation.
The historical facts are that Ford, the majority shareholder, was trying
to squeeze out the minority Dodge brothers and he did so by refusing to
declare dividends. His was an obvious effort to thwart the Dodges, which
130. Ibid at 929 [emphasis added].
131. Dodge v Ford, supra note 77. See also, Geoffrey Miller, "Narrative and Truth in Judicial
Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases" (2009) Mich St L Rev 831.
132. Yosifon, supra note 4.
133. Lynn Stout, "Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford" (2008) 3 Va L & Bus Rev 163.
134. Bainbridge, supra note 80.
135. Dodge v Ford, supra note 77 at 467.
136. Blair & Stout, supra note 39.
137. Bainbridge holds it as a representative of the doctrine.
138. Smith, supra note 21 at 318; Miller, supra note 131.
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he did by expanding the business in a rather transparently random way
as well as instituting a variety of employee and public benefit projects to
achieve his aims. To refocus Ford, the court held that an understanding of
the proper purpose of directors' powers was determined by the nature of
the company. The court stated:
The difference between an incidental humanitarian expenditure of
corporate funds for the benefit of the employe[e]s [sic], like the building
of a hospital for their use and the employment of agencies for the
betterment of their condition, and a general purpose and plan to benefit
mankind at the expense of others, is obvious[.] A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The
powers of the directors are to be employedfor that end. The discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself.'39
The court noted that "it is not within the lawful powers of a board of
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the
merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose
of benefiting others."' 4° The court was struggling at this point in history
with the identification of the changes in the corporate organization-with
members transitioning to investors. 4' It is interesting to see the wide
scope of CSR that the court allowed, from the founding of a hospital to
unspecified agencies to help workers that could be within the valid exercise
of directors' discretionary powers. Indeed, the legal issue addressed by the
court in the case was the change of the corporation from a business to a
charity, a change which would require a change to the constitution, and
such a change in all commonwealth jurisdictions and the U.S.A. can only
be done with shareholder approval."I Accordingly, the issue as framed by
the court in the case is not CSR, but a change in the objects or purpose of
the company from business to charity. Again, in the preceding quotation
the court states that it is "obvious".
The case focuses on the rights of members in relationship to other
members. As a result, the better interpretation Smith concludes is
as follows: "[i]n short, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is best viewed as a
minority oppression case. The case convincingly establishes the link
between the shareholder primacy norm and the modem doctrine of
139. Dodge v Ford, supra note 77 at 506-507 [emphasis added].
140. Ibid at 507.
141. Morton J Horwitz, The Transformation ofAmerican La, 1780-1860 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977) at 93.
142. Dodge v Ford, supra note 77.
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minority oppression" '143 and is not an authority for shareholder primacy as
shareholder wealth maximization or an authority against CSR.
Consider the more recent well-known American case of Shlensky v.
Wrigley, which concerned a decision by directors not to install lights at a
stadium where the installation would have generated additional revenues
from night time games. The directors' decision not to have games played
at night was based on a concern for the potentially detrimental effects on
the neighbourhood surrounding the stadium. The community protection
objective was their motivating purpose. Shareholders opposed the decision
and brought the matter before the courts. On appeal the court stated:
[I]t appears to us that the effect on the surrounding neighborhood might
well be considered by a director who was considering the patrons
who would or would not attend the games if the park were in a poor
neighborhood.. .the decision is one properly before directors and the
motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, illegality or
conflict of interest in their making of that decision. 'I
In yet another American case that sets a wide range of CSR activities within
the proper purpose constraints on directors' decision-making discretion,
AP Smith Manufacturing,45 the court stated:
There is no suggestion that it [the donation] was made indiscriminately or
to a pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance of personal rather
than corporate ends. On the contrary, it was made... in the reasonable
belief that it would aid the public welfare and advance the interests of the
plaintiff as a private corporation and as part of the community in which
it operates. We find that it was a lawful exercise of the corporation's
implied and incidental powers under common-law principles and that
it came within the express authority of the pertinent state legislation[.]
Corporations have come to... insure and strengthen the society which
gives them existence and the means of aiding themselves and their
fellow citizens. Clearly then, the appellants, as individual stockholders
whose private interests rest entirely upon the well-being of the plaintiff
corporation, ought not be permitted to close their eyes to present-day
realities and thwart the long-visioned corporate action in recognizing
and voluntarily discharging its high obligations as a constituent of our
modem social structure.
46
This statement merits comment. The judges have clearly stated that
the corporation is a participant in society, and must recognize such and
143. Ibid at 507.
144. Shlensky v Wrigley, 237 NE (2d) 776 at 180-181 (111 App Ct 1968).
145. Smith and Barlow, supra note 52 at 160-161.
146. Ibid at 160-161.
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contribute to society. Further, the court makes it clear that shareholders
may not "close their eyes to the present-day reality...of our modem
social structure." The court observes that the corporation relies on the
community and has a duty to support that community in return. To cause
the corporation to fulfil this duty is a proper purpose for directors' exercise
of their powers.
The case of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc."7
is sometimes thought to constrain the discretion of directors in attending
to CSR. The case does not do so. Rather, the decision clearly turns on
the facts. The directors of Revlon had set up an auction and then created
a lock-up .(anti-takeover strategy). 4 ' In other words, the directors had
determined to sell the company by auction and then sought to prevent the
highest bidder from winning. While the initial objective had been to keep
the company's enterprise operating as a going concern, an objective within
directors' discretion and enhancing CSR, as we have seen in Teck, once it
became clear that a break up of the company was inevitable, the directors'
obligation changed from consideration of constituency or CSR interests
to obtaining the highest price. It could be argued that this is simply a
particular application of the duty of care. In the case of a sale, whether in
this case the sale of the corporate equity, or any other sale, the directors'
duty is clearly to maximize the value.
The court opined:
[A] board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders... However, such concern for non-stockholder interests
is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress,
and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise
but to sell it to the highest bidder.'49
In other words, the court is not precluding CSR obligations; rather, it is
delineating when those obligations end.
The ongoing debate in American corporate law scholarship concerning
shareholder primacy and directors' duties is basic in this context. 50 On
the one hand, there are a number of scholars who take the view that
shareholder primacy is the positive law. On the other hand, a number
of leading scholars take a different view-that shareholder interests are
147. Revlon, supra note 123; followed in Mills Acquisition Co v Macmillan, Inc, 559 A (2d) 1261 at
1282 (I11 Sup Ct 1988).
148. The court notes "The somewhat complex maneuvers of the parties necessitate a rather detailed
examination of-the facts."
149. Revlon, supra note 123 at 182.
150. Yosifon, supra note 4.
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one among many interests to be taken into account in decision-making.
The focus of the debate tends to be the Ford, Unocal, Revlon, and more
recently, eBay v. Newmark,' cases.
All of these .cases are fundamentally driven by the fact patterns
and specific contexts. The cases of Ford and eBay are about whether a
company limited by shares can ignore'shareholder interests for purposes
of the public good. The clear answer is no. Such companies are set up to
benefit shareholders and directors cannot act contrary to that purpose, at
least indefinitely.
The court's position on this matter in eBay v. Newmark has interesting
echoes of Dodge v. Ford and as such merits a full quotation of the relevant
section:
The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, ai least not when
there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their
investment. Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit
Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from
eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay became a stockholder.
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are
bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form.
Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation
for the benefit of its stockholders. The "Inc." after the company name has
to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of
implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly,
and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit
Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.52
There should be nothing surprising or concerning for most corporate law
scholars in these words. The court is simply affirming that directors have a
wide range of factors to include in decision-making, that those factors are
dynamic, rising and falling over time, but that fundamentally, a corporation
cannot ignore shareholder wealth interests (not necessarily maximization)
when called upon by shareholders to do so. The court provided that even in
the context of a Delaware incorporated corporation, directors still maintain
a very wide discretion. Promoting shareholder benefits is included as one
valid objective, and a prohibition on not seeking to maximize economic
value are identified as constraints on directors' discretions. The court will
not interfere with directors' decisions as long as those decisions have
some relation to shareholder benefit, only narrowed to Unocal 's enhanced
standard of "rational relation" in the context of takeovers.
151. eBay Domestic Holdings, supra note 79.
152. Ibid at 60-61 [emphasis added].
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The eBay decision is similar to Dodge v. Ford. In both cases, the
one party respondent was not interested in wealth-i.e. was pursuing a
public purpose-whereas the party applicant was invested for the private
purposes of a return on private equity investment. In eBay v. Newmark the
court observed "[a]ll directors of Delaware corporations are fiduciaries
of the corporations' stockholders.""' This particular position may mark
Delaware as potentially distinct from at least some of its sister states.
As demonstrated above, none of the other Commonwealth jurisdictions
examined in this article have this duty that is focused on the corporate
body-what may be perhaps a better way of interpreting this statement
is that among the duties of directors under the Delaware law is a duty to
shareholders. Some such statement is wholly consistent with the argument
here: the argument is not that directors have no obligations to or can flout
shareholders' interests with impunity. Rather, the point is that directors
have a range of constituents and a number of considerations that are to be
invoked in decision-making.
As the court stated in eBay, "[p]romoting, protecting, or pursuing
non-stockholder considerations must lead at some point to value for
stockholders." '154 Where a rights agreement poison pill was adopted to
thwart monetization of craigslist.com, the court held that the directors
were in breach of their fiduciary duties of "promoting stockholder value,"
not maximization. Indeed, what the court found objectionable in that
case is that the whole purpose of the rights agreement was to thwart that
objective'l5-a purpose clearly and fundamentally contrary to the concept
of the corporation limited by shares.
The case of Revlon, like other similar cases, occurred in the context of
takeovers or wind ups where the survival of the enterprise operated by the
company was not expected. In these contexts, the court's examination and
evaluation of directors decision-making with reference to the corporation
refers back to the shareholders, the final constituency to have any interest at
all. Again, the court has held that shareholder interests cannot be ignored,
and indeed, in this wind up context, shareholders' economic interests are
paramount. Yet, it begs two questions: which shareholders, and which of
their interests? One could imagine, for example, a transaction in which
either or both the selling institutional investors and acquiring investors
have CSR policies that require consideration of social impacts-a
153. Ibid at 44.
154. Ibid at 57.
155. Ibid at 59.
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position held by major investment groups subscribing to the PRI.156
In such circumstances the interests of shareholders certainly include
wealth maximization; however, such a wealth maximization norm need
not exclude social responsibilities of the corporation. This is, in part, the
.meaning of the statement in Unocal, "like another business decision, the
board has a duty in the design and conduct of an auction to act in the
best interests of the corporation and its shareholders."' 57 The directors in
eBay failed because they acted in the absence of a credible threat and their
response was not proportionate-i.e. the Unocal test.
To say that the doctrine of shareholder primacy means exclusively
maximizing shareholder wealth is incorrect.'58 The controversy arising
from Revlon has a clear solution within the case itself. The court stated
that "the board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities provided they are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders." The statement does not preclude granting of benefits to
other stakeholders; rather, the consideration of other stakeholders cannot
be done in the absence of some benefit to shareholders-a position some
distance from the understanding of shareholder primacy as shareholder
wealth maximization or shareholder exclusivity-and interestingly, a
position wholly consistent with the jurisprudence of over a century and a
half, beginning with Hutton v. West Cork Railway.
Thus, the point of the cases is not that CSR is prohibited; rather,
the point is that directors' decision-making powers and the exercise of
their discretion must include the .shareholders among the beneficiaries.
In no case is the director impugned or censured for engaging in CSR or
considering interests other than those of the shareholders. Further, except in
the specific context of takeovers or winding up transactions, shareholders'
interests need not be at the forefront of directors' minds or dominant
when decision-making.'59 Simply, they are among other touch points for
decision-making. It is unfortunate that this jurisprudence arises almost
solely in the context of takeovers and so its applicability in other contexts
156. United Nations, PRI, supra note 91. This point is also made in David A Wishnick, "Corporate
Purposes in a Free Enterprise System: A Comment on eBay v. Newmark" (2012) 121 Yale LJ 2405 at
2413.
157. Note that the court assumes the two interests are co-terminus and does not identify what those
interests are to be.
158. Notwithstanding Chancellor Strine's statement equating shareholder primacy with shareholder
wealth maximization. See Yosifon, supra note 4 at 16.
159. This is the court's concern in eBay v Newmark. The court in that case took the higher standard
of review, the "enhanced scrutiny rule" from Unocal created in response to possible exploitation by
directors at corporate and shareholder expense in the context of takeovers, because the action taken
by the directors-thecreation of a Rights Plan favouring themselves-is readily subject to abuse. See
eBay Domestic Holdings, supra note 79 at 49-51.
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is unclear, but as it does, it is only appropriate to limit its application to
that takeover context. 160
In Canada, the Supreme Court has clarified directors' obligation to
non-shareholder constituents in both the Peoples and BCE litigation. In
the former case, the court stated in obiter:
We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether
they [directors] are acting with a view to the best interests of the
corporation it may be legitimate, given all the circumstances of a given
case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the interests of
shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments
and the environment. 6
In BCE, the same court stated: "In Peoples Department Stores, this
Court found that although directors must consider the best interest of the
corporation, it may also be appropriate, although not mandatory, to consider
the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or particular groups
of stakeholders."' 162 The controversy surrounding the case, which in that
instance required the directors to consider the interests of bondholders, and
which ultimately led to an increased level of court deference to directors,
as noted, has led to some controversy. The controversy appears to be
that there has been little articulation of the increased discretion and most
troublingly, the increased discretion has come without added duties to act
as a counter-balance. 163 It may well be that the Court, using the language
of "corporate citizenship," is pointing to the need to re-conceptualize the
corporation and its large social and ecological footprint as a social and
political actor with an eye to better regulation of it as such.
Nevertheless, in terms of the topic at hand, none of the hard cases in
any way prohibits CSR. Rather, each case, put in its proper context, does
no more than act to reinforce doctrines and ratios established in the earlier
discussion of directors' duties. In other words, there is nothing in these
latter cases prohibiting or even putting boundaries on CSR that is out of
the ordinary with respect to corporate law of directors' duties properly
understood.
160. The earlier discussion would lead one to suggest that given the wide range of discretions and
jurisprudence on directors' duties and decisions, to place a form of shareholder primacy in which
shareholder wealth maximization is the-sole and overriding objective of directors' duties is contrary
to law. In eBay Domestic Holdings, the court makes the observation of the dual standards of review
available--one in the ordinary course of business, the "deferential business standard," and another in
the takeover context, "the enhanced scrutiny standaid" from Unocal.
161. Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6.
162. BCE Inc, supra note 73.
163. VanDuzer, supra note 7.
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VI. CSR: the legislation
The legislation across the jurisdictions under consideration allows directors
to take account of CSR in their decision-making. As noted earlier, the
legislaion is not inconsistent with the common law. For the most part
it embodies the fiduciary duties and the duties of skill and care already
analysed. From the U.K.'s recent identification and address of the issue in
its latest reform of company law' 64 to the U.S.A.'s constituency legislation,
the legislation has refused to see corporations as being exclusively about
shareholder wealth maximization. The corporation serves other purposes.
Consider, for example, the most recent company law statute in the
U.K. The relevant section creates a mandatory duty to consider non-
shareholder interests. The section reads:
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good
faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company
for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have
regard (amongst other matters) to-
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company's employees,
(c) the need to foster the company's business relationships with
suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company's operations on the community and
the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for
high standards of business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of
or include purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection
(1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the
company for the benefit of its members were to achieving those
purposes.
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment
or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to
consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.
There is yet to be significant judicial interpretation of this section.165
However, it clearly imposes a duty on directors to consider non-
164. Scholarly opinion is divided as to the interpretation of the section as conservative, merely
codifying existing law, (Andrew R. Keay, "The.Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is it
Fit for Purpose?" online: (2010) SSRN <http://www.ssrn.com>) or reforming (Ian Havercrofl &Arad
Reisberg, "Directors' Duties Under the UK Companies Act 2006 and the Impact of the Company's
Operations on the Environment," online: (2010) SSRN <http://www.ssm.com>). The consensus,
however, is that it has and will have little effect in changing practice. To the extent practice is changing,
it is doing so in response to normative changes in the commercial environment-i.e. the license to
practice-rather than legislative reform.
165. See discussion in Keay, ibid.
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shareholders. The section unequivocally states that the consideration must
occur in light of the benefit of the members and take into consideration
the long-term effects on the company. 66 Although it has been argued that
this provision is no more than a codification of the existing position, that
view is hard to sustain. While corporate law in the U.K. has provided
wide latitude to directors in terms of decision-making discretion, it has not
mandated such. Further, the law of corporations has not identified which
shareholder-members are to be considered. Here the statute does exactly
that: it uses mandatory language and identifies the long-term shareholder.
Given that corporate law has neither identified the other interests that may
properly be considered, nor mandated consideration of the long-term,167
the section is reform. This analysis, however, is not the end of the matter.
When one considers the long term, it is difficult to consider the
members as a whole in any light other, than as forming an organization,
a collective and an enterprise in its own right. Section 172(l)(a) only
makes sense when interpreted that way. This interpretation coalesces with
Selznick's idea that "decision making in the light of long-run benefits
presumes a concept of the institution [and]... the empirical requirements
of organizational survival."'68 It cannot be the interests of one constituency
to the disregard and detriment of all others. The long term is the ongoing
life of an organization, an interest directly contrary to the short-term
shareholder interests which drive the stock market analysts' tyranny. 169
Further, the section makes an explicit acknowledgement of the social
footprint. It requires consideration of employment and the institutional
implications of decisions by reference to community and "reputation...
of business conduct." Clearly, these latter two-issues are not susceptible
to accurate measurement. Yet surely, they are core aspects of company
powers and hence ought to be core company responsibilities.
The U.S. position is not that different. U.S. directors are not wholly
free of such obligations. Indeed, the constituency legislation, as it is known,
imposes certain similar duties, but usually only in particular contexts-
again, takeovers. 170 For example, the Ohio Revised Code §1701.59 (F)
offers:
[A] director, in determining what the director reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation, shall consider the interests of the
166. Welling argues that this duty without sanction is rather meaningless. Welling, supra note 93.
167. Keay, supra note 164.
168. Selzick, supra note 107 at 47.
169. Ibid.
170. Roberta Romano, "Comment: What Is the Value ofOther Constituency Statutes to Shareholders?"
(1993) 43 UTLJ 553.
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corporation's shareholders and, in the director's discretion, may consider
any of the following:
(1) The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors,
and customers;
(2) The economy of the state and nation;
(3) Community and societal considerations;
(4) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and
its shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be
best served by the continued independence of the corporation. 7'
While the corporations law in the U.S.A. is state-based and varies
considerably across jurisdictions, there is the common model code or
similar provisions, which a number of jurisdictions have followed.172
Illinois, 173 Pennsylvania 174 and other states have similar provisions, as
does the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance,75
which are permissive in nature.176 That is, the legislation allows a range of
other interests to be considered by directors, but does not mandate such
consideration.
This view of the company as a whole, as an organization or institution
providing an object for directors' attention-as opposed to or beyond the
ethereal shareholder-is helpful. It both avoids the obvious shareholder
fictions and provides necessary guidance for directors. It adds some
reality to the actual complex balancing task facing directors. As Millon
observes, corporate norms (and by implication, directors) need to (1)
promote stable relations between certain non-shareholder constituencies
and the corporation, (2) adjust the gains between shareholders and non-
shareholders, (3) address the fairness in allocation of transaction costs,
and (4) look for ways to include in decision-making those most directly
effected by such decisions. 7 7 This view works well with Smith's view
that the objective of directors' duties is to increase the overall value of the
company including that of shareholders,. as opposed to shareholders only
171. Ohio Revised Code §1701.59
172. John H Matheson & Edward S Adams, "A Statutory Model for Corporate Constituency Concerns"
(2000) 49 Emory LJ 1085; Stephen M Bainbridge, "Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes" (1992) 19 Pepp L Rev 971. The Delaware General Corporation Law Section 122(9) provides
that a corporation has the power to "make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific
or educational purposes, and in time of war or other national emergency in aid thereof."
173. I11 Comp Stat Ann 805/8.85.
174. 15 Penn Stat § 1715.
175. American Law Institute Principles Of Corporate Governance §2.01.
176. Bainbridge, supra note 172 at 987-a position which has changed very little in the last two
decades. The Connecticut code makes consideration of non-shareholder interests mandatory.
Connecticut Gen Stat § 33-756 (2006).
177. David Millon, "New Directions In Corporate Law: Communitarians, Contractarians, And The
Crisis In Corporate Law" (1993) 50 Wash & Lee L Rev 1373 at 1388.
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and to the detriment of other claimants.'78 A broader scope to directors'
duties facilitates the exercise of discretion for the task. The modelling
developed by Jensen fails to address the difficult and complex tasks of
corporate directors and so cannot be a guide for the evaluation of their
decisions by courts or the development of corporate law. 179
The Canadian position is an interesting one. On the one hand, Canada
has stepped ahead of its American cousin through thejudgments in Peoples
and BCE. Indeed, its legislation allows the courts the discretion to fashion
such duties and rights. On the other hand, it has not fully developed its
approach. 80 It is at a halfway point between soft law and hard law.
The attempted legislative response by way of Bill-300, the Corporate
Accountability of Mining, Oil and Gas Corporations in Developing
Countries Act, and its failure to be passed, led the Canadian government
to create an Industry Canada CSR website and Extractive Industries
Counsellor.'8 ' Interestingly, perhaps the best way to characterize these
steps is what sociologists of law describe as "incipient law." Such law, as
Selznick explains, is "created by a stabilized public sentiment or pattern of
organization; it refers to a compelling claim of right or a practice so viable
and so important to a functioning institution as to make legal recognition
in due course highly probable."'8 2 Although the legislation did not pass in
this form, it is highly likely that its failure is not the end of the matter. Bill
C-300 directly emerges from wide stakeholder consultation that took place
through the National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and
the Canadian Extractive Sector in Developing Countries. It is consistent
with the recommendations of the National Roundtables Advisory
Group."'83 As Janda stated, "[t]here are good precedents internationally
and within existing Canadian practice for the kinds of measures Bill C-300
envisages."'184
Indeed, that part of the extractive industry that is connected to the
jewellery industry is being regulated by a number of international private
law systems such as the Kimberley process, the Responsible Jewellery
Council and others. Such initiatives may meet with limited success
because they are not unlike their public law counterparts, which also suffer
178. Smith, supra note 30.
179. Licht, supra note 10.
180. PM Vasudev, "Stakeholders in the Canada Business Corporations Act: An Appraisal and Some
Proposals," online; SSRN <http://www.ssm.com>.
181. Government of Canada, "Corporate Social Responsibility" (I December 2011), online: Industry
Canada <http://www.ic.gc.ca>.
182. Selznick, supra note 107 at 32.
183. Janda, supra note 1 at 2.
184. Ibid at 2.
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from regulatory failure. Despite the failings of private law initiatives, such
initiatives leave in their wake a sense among NGO's and civil society that
social costs can be controlled and that private regulation can accomplish
something, even if it is not to the extent that its advocates want. These
initiatives, while far from perfect, likely provide more than what would
have been achieved in their absence. The Canadian Extractive Industries
Counsellor has had very limited success because, at least in part, she was
limited by policies of the government of the day that prioritized economic
rights to the detriment of human rights. 8 5 Greater success may be obtained
in the fullness of time when a government more disposed towards human
rights takes power, and modifies the jurisdiction and power of the
Counsellor. In Australia, various Parliamentary bodies have examined the
issue of CSR, and although to date, no bills have been tabled to legislate
CSR, it is far from a dead topic.'86
If directors were to be challenged for socially responsible decisions as
contrary to the interests of the corporation, and they were not able to state
that there was an ultimate benefit to the corporation, there are two avenues
potentially available to exculpate them. These are the business judgment
rule and the unique organizing document, the corporate constitution or
charter.'87 Both of these rule sets may alter the directors' liability-indeed,
the constitution may positively re-direct it.'88 It is certainly possible to
create provisions within a constitution to permit a wide range of discretions
and obligations, which may provide little or no benefit to either the
corporation or its shareholders, at least in terms of economic gain. These
two approaches are discussed next in turn.
185. Catherine Coumans, "Mining and Access to Justice: From Sanction and Remedy to Weak
Non-Judicial Grievance Mechanisms" (2012) 45 UBC L Rev 651. See also, Catherine Coumans,
"Submission to the Government or Canada's Review of Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for
the Canadian Executive Sector" MiningWatch Canada (8 January 2014), online: MiningWatch Canada
<http://www.miningwatch.ca>.
186. Redmond, supra note 4. See also, Austl Commonwealth, Corporations and Markets Advisory
Committee, The Social Responsibility of Corporations Report (Sydney: Australian Government,
2006).
187. Articles of Association (United Kingdom) and Certificate of Incorporation (Delaware, United
States).
188. Generally, little attention is paid to the constituting documents with the exception of some
special purpose corporations such as the Benefit Corporation in the USA, or other non-shareholder
companies such as companies limited by guarantee. See, e.g., Vermont Benefit Corporations Act tit
HA, s 21 (2009).
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VII. Exculpation of directors'exercise of discretion
Prior to turning to that discussion it is worth addressing a point made
by Yosifon.' 9 In his paper, he objects to directors being excused from
shareholder wealth maximization on the basis of the business judgment
rule. Yosifon believes that directors can only enter into plans to benefit
non-shareholder constituents by failing to be forthright about the objectives
of their decision. Because of his interpretation of shareholder primacy
as an inviolable duty to maximize shareholder wealth at all times in all
instances, he believes that directors who wish to benefit non-shareholders
cannot do so except by subterfuge. This approach, he argues, is analogous
to the U.S. military's infamous practice: "don't ask, don't tell," which he
rightly describes as "a dishonorable and dysfunctional way to bring non-
shareholder interests into the boardroom, where formal law forbids their
presence."' 190
Yosifon is correct in this characterization; however, there is clear,
open and frank discussion about the pursuit of social objectives by the
majority of large industrial organizations around the world through their
sustainability initiatives and related reporting. 9' These decisions, whether
to participate in the UN's Global Compact, the International Organization
for Standardization's 26000, the Global Reporting Initiative, or other
international private regulatory systems, appear to be within the range of
legally permitted discretions-at least if one considers that theyare clearly
being made on the explicit advice of lead corporate counsel globally.
Further, participation in such schemes is more than mere rhetoric. 92 It
should be remembered that counsel that advise these corporations also
advise shareholders who might be looking to increase funds available
to shareholders by opposing such schemes. Certainly, it doubtful that
the Delaware court, which entertains shareholder lawsuits contesting
corporate investments in various types of activities, would declare the
practice illegal.
189. Corporate responsibility reporting has become de facto law for business. See KPMG, "KPMG
International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2013" (9 December 2013), online: KPMG
<http://www.kpmg.com>; Yosifon, supra note 4.
190. KPMG, ibid, Yosifon, ibid.
191. KPMG, ibid. See Sheehy, Defining CSR, supra note 4; Perry E Wallace, "Climate Change,
Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are Things Heating up in the Boardroom" (2008) 26 Va
Envtl LJ 293.
192. Lisa Fairfax, "The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate
Norms" (2006) 31 J Corp L 675.
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1. Business judgment rule
The first approach to defending directors against an attack for taking
non-shareholder considerations into decision-making is by way of the
business judgment rule. The rule is a doctrinal and positive expression of
the extent of the law's deference to directors' decision-making powers and
discretion. Although the courts have stated time and again that they are
unwilling and not competent to substitute their own view of what the right
or better decision would be,'93 in many jurisdictions, legislation has been
passed explicitly declaring that in the absence of compelling evidence to
the contrary, directors are entitled to be taken as operating bona fides and
within their discretions. ' 94
In the U.S.A., where the rule originated, it has been explained thusly:
"directors of a corporation... are clothed with [the] presumption, which the
law accords to them, of being [motivated] in their conduct by a bona fide
regard for the interests of the corporation whose affairs the stockholders
have committed to their charge."'95 In Australia, the statutory version
states that:
A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business
judgment is taken to meet.. .their... duties... in respect of the judgment if
they: make the judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; do not have
a material personal interest in the subject matter of the judgment; and
inform themselves about the subject matter of the judgment to the extent
they reasonably believe to be appropriate; and rationally believe that the
judgment is in the best interests of the corporation. 196
In other words, where directots have discharged their duties, they have a
complete defence to any challenge to their decisions. Indeed, it is hard to
see why the statutory rule was enacted as it seems redundant. 19 Some see
it as dangerous.'9 8 The statutory business judgment rule, however, is not
ubiquitous as neither the Canadian nor the U.K. legislation has a business
193. See, e.g., Darvall, supra note 123: "the purpose of the court's jurisdiction.. .is... not to substitute
an ex post decision for that of the directors, on the merits of a particular dealing. It is to assure the
integrity of their decision at the time in the exercise of their fiduciary powers."
194. Smith & Fawcett, supra note 122 at 308.
195. Gimbel v Signal Cos, 316 A (2d) 599 at 608 (Del Ch 1974).
196. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 180(2); CBCA, supra note 23, s'123(5).
197. Paul Redmond, "Safe Harbours or Sleepy Hollows: Does Australia Need a Statutory Business
Judgment Rule?" in Ian Ramsay, ed, Corporate Governance and the Duties of Company Directors
(Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 1997). In the US, see Franklin Gevrutz, "The Business
Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?" (1994) 67 S Cal L Rev 287.
198. Mark Byrne, "Directors to hide from a sea of liabilities in a new safe harbour" (2008) 22 Austl J
Corp L 255.
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judgment rule. Those jurisdictions see the basic principles enshrined in the
case law as sufficient.199
Yet, the business judgment rule has an important contribution to
understanding the relationship between CSR, directors' discretion and
their duties. Viewed in the negative, Reinhardt and Stavins observe
"[t]he business judgement rule makes fiduciary duties difficult to enforce,
and it effectively grants managers discretion to 'temper business decision-
making with their perceptions of social values.' 2°° They continue: "as
a practical matter, as long as managers can plausibly claim that their
actions are in the long-run interests of the firm, it is almost impossible for
shareholders to challenge the actions of managers who act in the public
interest. 201
Questions may be posed concerning the scope of the business judgment.
rule. In Australia, the statutory answer is as quoted above: as far as "[t]he
director's or officer's belief that the judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation is a rational one. 202 In other words, as Reinhardt and Stavins
explain: "Corporate managers' decisions can be regarded as irrational-
and thus not protected by the business judgement rule-only if they 'go so
far beyond the bounds of reasonable business[.]1 2°3 Accordingly, directors
pursuing CSR strategies are free to do so. Where they are challenged, they
should expect complete protection from the business judgment rule. This
position is wholly paralleled by U.S. law.2°a All of the cases discussed to
this point corroborate this view. In every one of them, the court upheld
decisions in favour of non-shareholder constituencies except in the case
of an auction. Although none of these cases were decided on the basis of
the business judgment rule, it may well be argued that these cases would
support the view that CSR type decisions fall within the normal business
judgment of directors and so are not reviewable by the courts.
2. Objects clause and the corporate constitution
Historically, the purpose of the corporation was set out in its constituting
documents. This constitution contained an objects clause which, among
other things, guided the directors of the corporation with respect to the
exercise of discretion in decision-making: what was within the scope of the
199. MapleleafFoods Inv v Schneider Corp (1998), 42 OR (3d) 177 at 192. Referred to with approval
in Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6 at 39.
200. Forest L Reinhardt & Robert N Stavins, "Corporate social responsibility, business strategy, and
the environment" (2010) 26 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 164 at 167 [footnotes omitted].
201. Ibid at 9.
202. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 180(2).
203. Reinhardt & Stavins, supra note 200 at 9.
204. See Smith, supra note 21 at 286-288.
Anglo-American Directors' Legal Duties and 389
CSR: Prohibited, Permitted or Prescribed?
objects of the corporation; and whether that corporation was a charitable
corporation or a trading corporation. Both facets of the objects clause
limited and guided the directors' decision-making in terms of strategic
decisions as well as more specific tactical decisions concerning the
expenditures and revenues of the entity. This approach may be considered
an ex ante approach to permitting or even mandating CSR.
Although today the strength of the objects clause and the related doctrine
of ultra vires is all but finished in most common law jurisdictions,2 5 the
corporation's objects may both guide and exculpate directors in and for
their decisions. For example, section 2.1 of Australian Ethical Investment
Limited's constitution provides that the company will order its affairs
including its investments so as to aid:
(a) the development of workers' participation in the ownership and
control of their work organisations and places;.. .(e) the amelioration
of wasteful or polluting practices;... (h) activities which contribute to
human happiness, dignity and education; (i)'the dignity and well being
of non human animals; (j) the efficient use of human waste; (k) the
alleviation of poverty in all its forms. 206
This constitution allows investment decisions to be made on matters
that are extraneous from an economic or financial perspective while
critical to social objects. Indeed, while the company is a trading company
and so seeks to make a profit for the shareholders, it aims, as noted in the
constitution, to make the employees significant shareholders. Directors of
such companies have a particular mandate to engage in CSR activities, and
the mandate will inform and shape their particular duties.
VIII. Balancing changing priorities in a dynamic environment
As the cases indicate, the context is determinative of the obligation, which
although always directed to the corporation, may require a particular
constituent to be considered or ignored. In a pre-incorporation or pre-
purchase context, the company may be liable to outsiders about to invest
and so require directors to attend to those interests.207 As such, it is better
law to state that the focus of company attention, and hence the focal point
for directors' duties, are not set in stone.
205. Paul J Omar, "Powers, Purposes and Objects: The Protracted Demise of the Ultra Vires Rule"
(2004) 16 Bond L Rev 93.
206. Australian Ethical Investment Limited, "Constitution" (27 November 2008), online: Australian
Ethical Investment Limited <http://www/australianethical.com.au>.
207. Meridian Global Funds Management Asia v Securities Commission, [1995] 3 NZLR 7 (PC) and
Sons of Gwalia v Margaretic, [2007] 231 CLR 160 (HCA)-the latter modified by legislative reform.
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It is not as if the court or the legislature has dictated "you must
maximize shareholder wealth in all instances" or even "shareholder
interests must always come first or you are in breach of your fiduciary
obligations." Rather, the law is that directors are required to exercise
discretion, as Blair and Stout argue, balancing a dynamic team engaged
in production.2 °8 This statement means that directors are required both to
determine objectives and to prioritize between those competing objectives
on an ongoing basis.209 In organizational terms, this issue is described as
goal complexity. 21° Accordingly, directors both need and have a wide berth
of discretion-a position recognized at law through the doctrine ofjudicial
deference and the business judgment rule.
Again, in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debenture Holders, the court stated:
There is no principle that one set of interests - for example the interests
of shareholders - should prevail over another set of interests. Everything
depends on the particular situation faced by the directors and whether,
having regard to that situation, they exercised business judgment in a
responsible way."1
In Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee oJ) v. Wise, the same court
opined:
The various shifts in interests that naturally occur as a corporation's
fortunes rise and fall do not, however, affect the content of the fiduciary
duty under s. 122(l)(a) of the CBCA. At all times, directors and officers
owe their fiduciary obligation to the corporation. The interests of the
corporation are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or
those of any other stakeholders. 21 1
Directors must shift priorities to address operational issues as, for example,
when operations require them to begin to deal with new substances and so
environmental concerns become paramount, or where new machinery or
new processes are implemented, to attend to occupational health and safety
issues. These priorities may indeed be destructive of shareholder wealth,
yet at law they must be addressed and prioritized over shareholder wealth.
Economic ideas of efficient breach that condone non-compliance on the
basis of economic norms, cannot be allowed to override fundamental
legal obligations-something even Milton Friedman acknowledged when
208. Blair & Stout, supra note 39.
209. Licht, supra note 10.
210. Michael D Cohen, "Conflict and Complexity: Goal Diversity and Organizational Search
Effectiveness" (1984) 78 The American Political Science Review 435.
211. BCE Inc, supra note 73 at para 84.
212. Peoples Department Stores, supra note 6.
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he added to his prescription "to make as much money as possible" the
condition "while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. '2 13 Directors
must balance and shift priorities regularly and promptly if they are to
discharge both their legal duties and operational responsibilities. Far
from an unwavering focus on shareholder wealth, the directors' job is a
continual balancing act in a dynamic, ever-changing environment. Law
acknowledges and protects that reality.
In dealing with what might be considered a line of hard cases, the
Revlon line,214 which some have interpreted as mandating continual
shareholder primacy and wealth maximization, particularly in a takeover
context, the Supreme Court of Canada made the following observations.
What is clear is that the Revlon line of cases has not displaced the
fundamental rule that the duty of the directors cannot be confined to
particular priority rules, but is rather a function of business judgment of
what is in the best interests of the corporation, in the particular situation
it faces. In a review of trends in Delaware corporate jurisprudence,
former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey put
it this way:
[I]t is important to keep in mind the precise content of this "best
interests" concept-that is, to whom this duty is owed and when.
Naturally, one often thinks that directors owe this duty to both the
corporation and the stockholders. That formulation is harmless in
most instances because of the confluence of interests, in that what
is good for the corporate entity is usually derivatively good for the
stockholders. There are times, of course, when the focus is directly
on the interests of stockholders. But, in general, the directors owe
fiduciary duties to the corporation, not to the stockholders." 5
Reinforcing this view of a duty to multiple stakeholders in the dynamic
environment of decision-making, statutory derivative actions in a number
of jurisdictions216 provide rights to non-shareholders suggesting that it is
not only shareholder interests that need to be taken into account by directors
when making decisions. For example, in Australia, section 1324(1) of the
Corporations Act provides:
213. Friedman, supra note 9.
214. Revlon, supra note 123 and Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A (2d) 946 (Del Sup Ct
1985).
215. E Norman Veasey & Christine T Di Guglielmo, "What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments" (2005) 153 U Pa L
Rev 1399 at 1431.
216. Melissa Hoffman, "The Statutory Derivative Action in Australia," online: (2006) 13 Corporate
Governance ejournal <http://www.bond.edu.au>.
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Where a person has engaged, is engaging or is proposing to engage
in conduct that constituted, constitutes or would constitute: (a) a
contravention of this Law; (b) attempting to contravene this Law;.. .the
Court may, on the application of [ASIC], or a person whose interests
have been, are or would be affected by the conduct, grant an injunction
on such terms as the Court thinks appropriate, restraining the first-
mentioned person from engaging in the conduct and, if the opinion of
the Court it is desirable to do so, requiring a person to do any act or thing.
Although, as Bainbridge rightly observes, whether a court prefers
shareholder primacy or social responsibility, it ultimately does not matter:
"[u]nder either approach, directors who consider non-shareholder interests
in making decisions, like directors who do not, will be insulated from
liability by the business judgment rule." '217 This is true, at least where
their decisions are not in clear breach of their duties. From a practical
perspective, as noted, there is little real threat of personal director liability
in any event.21 1 Yet it is important to note that directors' duties are not
interpreted by courts as statically focused on some pole star or objective
function as Jensen, Meckling and other economists may have it.2 19
Conclusion
In the contemporary environment of increased demands on industrial
organizations housed in corporations, polarized political debate, and
expanding corporate reach, the guidance and delineation of directors' legal
duties, management responsibilities and social obligations becomes more
complex. In light of these developments, CSR is seen as a problem as well
as a solution. 2 0 It is a problem in that it is thought to be contrary to corporate
law, and contrary to shareholders' interests. It is a solution in that it accepts
the realities of organizational goal complexity and allows corporations to
act in ways that reflect their social context and hence, social obligation.22 1
The law's conception of the corporation is problematic and complex,222
217. Bainbridge, supra note 172 at 980.
218. Brown, supra note 24.
219. Jensen, supra note 30.
220. CA Harwell Wells, "The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective
for the Twenty-First Century" (2002) 51 U Kan L Rev 77-
221. Sheehy, "The Importance," supra note 76.
222. F Patfield, "Challenges for Company Law" in F Patfield, ed, Perspectives of Company Law
(London: Kluwer Law Inernational, 1995) cited in Michael Cody, "Evaluating Australia's Corporate
Law Reform from an Organisational Theory Perspective" (2008) 21 Austrl J Corp L 210:
"Company law is complex because it is concerned with the structuring and organisation
of economic power.. .lf we want our company law to play any sensible role at all then
we must resign ourselves to the fact of its conceptual complexity. Laws about complex
subjects in complex societies should be so otherwise they run the risk of becoming entirely
marginal and irrelevant to those matters which they purport to govern."
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with the predictable outcome that the parameters of directors' discretion
and delineation of directors' duties with respect to the corporation is even
more problematic. The discretion given to directors to some degree reflects
that difficulty and complexity just as the focal points of their responsibility
is contingent to the environment, including the social environment, which
makes up the corporate context.
Corporate directors owe an obligation, albeit an imperfect one, to non-
shareholders,22 as indeed, .they do to shareholders when one considers
structural shareholder primacy. 24 If one wishes to discuss trajectories of
corporate law225 in the Hegelian terms of Hansmann and Kraakman, 226 it
would seem that the synthesis is moving away from shareholder wealth
maximization and moving instead toward a broad perspective of the
corporation as an institution with a strong component of CSR.227
This is evident from the case law and legislation discussed above.
Directors are prohibited from taking account of non-shareholder
constituents only in the most limited context of actions. Directors are
permitted to take account of non-shareholder constituents in any of their
regular business decisions. Finally, in the context of takeovers, they are
commanded by law to consider the interests of non-shareholders. To
suggest that CSR is beyond the scope of directors' discretion and that
to engage in CSR activities benefiting non-shareholder constituents is
a breach of duties is simply incorrect. Even in American law, with its
shareholder primacy doctrine, the context-driven duties described above
operate. CSR is part of corporate law.
The discussion illustrates this complexity in the dynamic context
in which corporate directors must execute their responsibilities. It is
inaccurate to declare that the company is concerned with the exclusive
interest of shareholders' wealth maximization. Contrary to Hansmann and
Kraakman's view of shareholder wealth maximization dominating the
world for its own good-i.e. referring to the good of both the company and
the world-society has moved beyond. Law in both practice and theory
223. As Welling points out, as no corollary rights have been granted to affected parties (Welling, supra
note 93). Interestingly, D Gordon Smith makes the observation that directors do not owe shareholders
a duty in respect of the shareholder primacy norm. He writes "although it is possible for shareholders
to prevail on claims that the board of directors violated the shareholder primacy norm, such cases are
extremely rare," (Smith, supra note 21 at 288).
224. As noted above, D Gordon Smith observes that the shareholder primacy norm, the basic norm in
US law is largely unenforceable, (Smith, supra note 21 at 322-323).
225. Brian Cheffins, "The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship: Inaugural Lecture" (Paper
delivered at the University of Cambridge, October 2003), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004).
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needs to keep abreast of its changing environment and nowhere more so
than in the realm of corporate law regulating the growing corporation with
its great reach and powers. Corporate commentators deride the ideological
foolishness of shareholder primacy,22 and Jack Welch has referred to it as
"the dumbest idea in the world." '229 Those who have made their careers on
espousing it as part of neo-classical economic religion and conservative
ideology 2 0 are unlikely to "see the light. '23'
Although both shareholder primacy and the shareholder democracy
movements have been overtaken by the decline of the large publicly traded
corporation, 23 2 the debate still goes on. Davis points out that the large
industrial enterprise that was a defining feature of the American socio-
economic landscape (and arguably a significant part of the developed world
as well), first described by Berle and Means, is no longer. That corporation
provided significant levels of domestic employment, was funded by
dispersed shareholdings, was involved in manufacturing and infrastructure
and was long-lasting.233 In its stead are a number of corporations that offer
far fewer jobs and have low levels of domestic manufacture, among other
things. The shares in these corporations are held and controlled by a small
group of institutional investors. 234 These institutional investors have taken
a vast amount of the savings of small time investors who have been forced
to invest in the share market because of the privatization of government
pension schemes, hoping to secure retirement incomes. 235 The institutional
investors are largely uninterested in the social aspects of corporate
behaviour: their focus is short-term profits, which are more readily gained
by sacrificing long-term viability, which includes consideration of social
and environmental concerns. These shareholders cannot be expected
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to shift their focus to the long-term because of pressures on them from
hedge-funds and other financial institutions, as well as their own self-
interest in compensation structures directly related to short-term financial
performance.
Thus, where corporations are essentially operating using peoples'
pensions and generating massive externalities, 236 it is less appropriate than
ever that they be left to the unscrutinized wanderings of the invisible hand
with the law's support. The law should not mandate that directors consider
only some imaginary shareholder.237 The public company has changed,
and with it, public duties. The demand for CSR and its facilitation
by appropriate interpretation and application of directors' duties is a
fundamental step in that direction.
236. Benedict Sheehy, "Corporations And Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study" (2004) 24 JL &
Corn 1.
237. Sheehy, supra note 112.

